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I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, the negligence principles contained in the Italian Civil
Code determined a manufacturer's liability for damages caused by
defective products.1 Although there was no theory of strict liability, in
situations of mass produced consumer products Italian courts had
developed the doctrine of the manufacturer's "presumed negligence." 2
Instead of requiring the consumer to prove negligence, as is the rule in
cases governed by article 2043 of the Civil Code, in appropriate
circumstances the courts inferred negligence on the basis of a triple
presumption: from the consumer's injury the court would infer the
existence of a defect in the product; from the defect the court inferred
defective manufacturing; from this it inferred the manufacturer's
negligence.' As the Corte di Cassazione explained, it is not always
necessary for the plaintiff to provide specific evidence of the defendant's
negligence, because a court may infer such negligence on the basis of
circumstantial evidence and common experience as to that which ordinarily
occurs in given circumstances. 4 This approach calls to mind the common
law doctrine of res ipsa !oquitur.f This procedural exercise, it should be
1. CODICE CIVILE [C.c.] arts. 2043-2059 (It.), translated in THE ITALIAN CIVIL CODE
AND COMPLEMENTARY LEGISLATION (Mario Beltramo et al. trans., 1991). The existing
legal framework also included special statutes that govern food, drugs, cosmetics and toys.
GUIDO ALPA, IL DIRIrO DEI CONSUMATORI 246 (1995).
2. Andrea Barenghi, In tema di fannaci difettosi, Giur. It. I, 1, 1331, 1335 (1992)
(citing as the leading case Cass. civ., 25 maggio 1964, n. 1270, Foro It. 1965, I, 2098)
[hereinafter Saiwa cookie case].
3. Id.
4. Cass. civ., 28 ottobre 1980, n.5795, RESPONSABILITA C1VILE E PREVIDENZA [RESP.
CIV. PREY.], 1981, 392 cited in Andrea DeBerardinis, La responsabilitb extracontrattuale
per danno daprodotti difettosi, in RESP. CIV. PREY. 675, 686 n.l14 (1996). The limitations
on "discovery" of evidence in Italy, as in most civil law countries, is likely to make proof
of negligence even harder.
5. See Dermatossian v. New York City Transit Auth., 492 N.E.2d 1200,1203 (N.Y.
1986). In the Saiwa cookie case, the court reasoned that because the record excluded any
negligence by the retailer, it was permissible for the trial court in the exercise of its
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stressed, concerned the application of article 2043 of the Civil Code and
was, therefore, independent of the article 2050 presumption of negligence
in the exercise of dangerous activities.6 It was an attempt to remedy the
perceived need for substantive rules that would dispense the injured
consumer from proving a manufacturer's negligence. Italian legal scholars
had pushed for such an evolution of tort law that would meet the new
challenges created by the increasingly industrialized society.' It should be
noted that in Italy judicial decisions are not a source of law, as they are in
the United States. More particularly, American tort law is largely a result
of decisional law. This, in part, accounts for the earlier appearance in
American jurisdictions of substantive rules that governed strict products
liability. It also explains why Italian courts resorted to a procedural device
to achieve substantially similar results.
With the Decree of the President of the Republic of May 24, 1988 on
liability for defective products, 9 Italy has implanted a set of strict liability
principles, applicable in limited circumstances, into the system of its
traditional negligence rules. The Decree created a category of non-
contractual liability independent of any contractual relationship between a
manufacturer and a consumer.10 This was done by enactment of a special
statute instead of by incorporation of the new rules into the Civil Code.
discretion to find that the only possible cause of the defect was faulty manufacturing. Foro
It. 1965, I, 2098.
6. C.C. arts. 2043 and 2050. It is interesting to note how in different legal systems the
substantive rules of strict liability in tort first appeared in provisions that governed the
performance of hazardous activities. See e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519,
520 (1965) (adopting the principle enunciated in the English House of Lords in Rylands
v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868)); for Scandinavia see Henry Ussing, The Scandinavian
Law of Torts: Impact of Insurance on Tort Law, I AM. J. COMP. L. 359, 362 (1952); for
Poland see Adam Szpunar, The Law of Tort in the Polish Civil Code, 16 INT. & COMP.
L. Q. 86, 92-93 (1967).
7. Roberto Pardolesi et al., La responsabilitfi per danno da prodotti difettosi, anno XII
LE NUOVE LEGGI CIVILI COMMENTATE [NUOVE LEGGI Cv.] 497, 498 (1989).
8. It is noteworthy that the Saiwa cookie case was handed down four years after
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960), and two years after Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
9. Presidential Decree No. 224 of May 24, 1988, Gazz. Uff., 23 giugno 1988, n.146,
Lex LXXIV, part I, 1390 (1988), translated in 32 I.L.M. 1382 [hereinafter Decree No. 224
or Decree](the translation provided in this article is the translation of the author, Richard
H. Dreyfuss, on file with author).
10. Tentori v. Soc. Rossin, Trib. Monza, 21 luglio 1993, Foro It. 1994, 1, 251, 253.
In New York, the privity requirement was eliminated, with respect to negligence actions,
in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916), and with respect to a
strict liability action, in Codling v. Paglia, 298 N.E.2d 622 (N.Y. 1973).
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Since the Decree's rules are in derogation of the general principles set
forth in the Civil Code, 1 they should be read strictly.' 2 Moreover, the
general principles should apply where the Decree is silent. 3 The Decree
is the result of Italy's duty as a member state to implement the European
Union Council Directive no. 85/374 of July 25, 1985 on the approximation
of the member states' laws, regulations and administrative provisions
concerning liability for defective products.14 The Directive's first Whereas
clause found that an "approximation of the laws" was necessary to
eliminate the distortion of competition and the differing degree of
protection of the consumer in the European Union. 15  Recently, Italy
enacted Legislative Decree No. 115 of March 17, 1995, implementing
E.U. Council Directive 92/59 concerning general product safety. 6 While
this statute provides for criminal penalties, it is likely to affect products
liability law.' 7
The introduction of the strict liability rules was unanimously viewed
with favor, because there was a consensus that the negligence doctrines
were inadequate to govern many situations arising from the production and
distribution of consumer products .' The concern for greater consumer
protection, however, has not modified practices concerning access to
justice by consumers. For example, consumers must face the traditional
Italian "loser pays" rule. 19 Indeed, it can be argued that fear of having to
pay a successful defendant's attorney's fees discourages valid claims by
consumers. 20 In addition, contingency fee arrangements continue to be
11. Giulio Ponzanelli, Dal biscotto alla "mountain bike"- la responsabilitg da prodotto
difettoso in Italia, Foro It. 1994, I, 252, 258.
12. GUIDo ALPA, IL DIRITTO DEI CONSUMATORI 248 (1995)
13. Decree No. 224 art. 15 explains that it adds a cause of action in addition to the
traditional remedies, which remain available.
14. Council Directive 85/374, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29 [hereinafter Directive 85/374]. It
is generally acknowledged that the European Union looked to the United States' products
liability experience as a model for the Directive. Barenghi, supra note 2, at 1336.
15. Directive 85/374, at 29.
16. Legislative Decree No. 115 of March 17, 1995, Gazz. Uff., 20 aprile 1995, n.92,
Lex LXXXI, part I, 1125 (1995) implementing Council Directive No. 92/59, 1992 O.J.
(228) [hereinafter Decree No. 115].
17. Fabrizio Cafaggi, La nozione di difetto ed il ruolo dell'informazione, RIVISTA
CRITICA DI DiRITro PRIVATO [Riv. CRJT. D.P.] 447, 448 (1995).
18. Pardolesi, supra note 7, at 507.
19. A judgment or order which finally determines an action includes an award for court
costs and the prevailing party's attorney's fees. CODICE DI PROC9DURA CIVILE [C.P.C.] art.
91 (It.).
20. It should be noted, however, that the fees charged by attorneys for tort litigation
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both void and unethical."' Despite these practices, which in the United
States are viewed as obstacles to civil litigation, the number of lawsuits
filed each year in Italy has been increasing.2
Under Italian conflicts of law rules, the applicable substantive law in
a tort action is the law of the jurisdiction in which the event occurred
unless the plaintiff requests the law of the jurisdiction where the incident
which caused the harm occurred.23 Where the claim is for products
liability, however, the plaintiff may choose either the law of the place of
the manufacturer's domicile or management offices or that of the place
where the product was purchased unless the manufacturer proves that the
product was placed into the stream of commerce without its consent. 24 The
rule is one of as yet few conflict of laws provisions that specifically deal
with a manufacturer's tort liability for defective products.25 The rule is
seen as a fair compromise between granting greater protection to the
defense in Italy are likely to be substantially lower than in the United States. Unless
otherwise agreed, fees must comply with the guidelines issued every two years by the
National Forensic Council and enacted by a Decree of the Ministry of Justice.
Ordinamento delle professioni di avvocato e di procuratore, Royal Decree-Law No. 1578
of Nov. 27 1933 art. 57, Gazz. Uff., 5 dicembre 1933, n.281, Lex XIX, 1704 (1933),
converted into law with amendments by Law No. 36 of Jan. 22, 1934, Gazz. Uff., 30
gennaio 1934, n.24, Lex XX, 199 (1934), as modified. Moreover, the fee awarded by the
court, and payable by the losing party, generally is lower than the fee the attorney may
charge the client.
21. C.c. art. 2233(3).
22. The number of lawsuits filed in 1995 was twenty percent more than in 1994.
Roberto della Rovere, Italiani pit litigiosi e grazie agli immigrati la popolazione non cala,
CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Dec. 27, 1996, at 16.
23. Law No. 218 of May 31, 1995 art. 62, Riforma del sistema italiano di diritto
internazionale privato, Gazz. Uff., 3 giugno 1995, n. 128, suppl. ord. n.68, Lex LXXXI, part
I, 1808 (1995) [hereinafter Law No. 218], which replaced art. 25(2), Disposizioni sulla
legge in generale [Preleggi].
24. Id. art. 63. One federal court opined that under New York choice of law rules, the
law of the forum where the products are sold and consumed should apply. Doe v. Hyland
Therapeutics Div., 807 F.Supp. 1117, 1130 n. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). The New York rule is
that a claim for products liability is governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the tort
occurred, because that jurisdiction has the greater interest in regulating behavior within its
borders. Sadkin v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 638 N.Y.S.2d 435, 436 (App. Div.
1996) (citing Padula v. Lilarn Properties Corp., 644 N.E.2d 1001 (N.Y. 1994)). Once a
finding that the applicable substantive law is that of another jurisdiction, however, a New
York court may refuse to apply the foreign law because it is repugnant to New York's
public policy. Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985).
25. Alberto Saravalle, Recenti sviluppi in materia di responsabilitti civile in diritto
internazionale privato comparato, RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO E
PROCESSUALE [RIV. DIR. INT. PRIV. PROC.] 657, 670 (1995).
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
weaker party, the consumer, and permitting the manufacturer to foresee
with reasonable certainty the applicable law and ensure against the relevant
risks.26 Accordingly, a foreign manufacturer's liability may be governed
by the Decree's provisions if the product was purchased in Ital y.27 It
should be noted that there is no renvoi to another law in matters of non-
contractual obligations.28
The purpose of this article is to explain the Decree's provisions. In
this attempt, it makes comparisons with American law, especially New
York law. However, not enough time has passed to enable the courts to
interpret the Decree.2 9 In addition, recent Italian product safety standards
legislation3 ° may well keep strict products liability litigation to a
minimum.3' Accordingly, this article also speculates on how the Italian
courts might apply some of its unclear provisions or address certain issues
on which the Decree apparently is silent. The Decree's provisions are
examined under the following headings: A. Elements of the Claim (Arts.
1 - 5 and 11); B. Entry into the Stream of Commerce (Art. 7); C.
Defenses (Arts. 6, 9, 10, 12 - 14); D. Burden of Proof (Art. 8); E.
Coordination of the Decree with the Broader Legal System (Arts. 15 and
16).
26. Id.
27. On the unlikely applicability of Italian law by a court in the United States in an
action against an American manufacturer see WARREN FREEDMAN, PRODUCT LIABILITY
AcTIONS BY FOREIGN PLAINTIFFS IN THE UNITED STATES 179-84 (1988). But see, In re
New York County DES Litigation, 636 N.Y.S.2d 338 (App. Div. 1996) (foreign
substantive law applicable where foreign plaintiffs exposure to DES occurred in foreign
state). For a discussion of the forum non conveniens issue in suits against U.S.
corporations see John P. Wilson, Limitation of Manufacturer Liability forA dministration
of an AIDS Vaccine Overseas, 30 INT'L LAWYER 783, 792-96 (1996).
28. Law No. 218 art. 13(2).
29. The first reported decision in which a court applied the Decree was Tentori v. Soc.
Rossin, Trib. Monza, 21 luglio 1993, Foro It. 1994, I, 251, 253, where the defective
product was purchased in August 1989. Moreover, the initial applications of the Decree
are likely to be characterized by hesitation and inconsistency. See Anna Dassi, Sulla
responsabiliti del rivenditore per danno da prodotto difettoso, in RESP. CIV. PREv., 458,
461 (1992); Tentori, Foro It. 1994, I, at 251-52 editor's note.
30. See e.g., Decree No. 115.
31. See Giulio Ponzanelli, Comment to Bassi v. Poliedro di Guzzo e C. s.n.c., Trib.
Milano, 13 aprile 1995, DANNO E REsPONSABILITA [DANNO E RFISP.] 383, 384-85 (1996).
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II. ANALYSIS OF DECREE No. 224
A. Elements of the Claim
This heading examines 1) the basis for liability (article 1), 2) the
potential plaintiffs and defendants (articles 3 and 4), 3) the concept of
"defective product" (articles 2 and 5), and 4) recoverable damages (article
11).
1. The Basis for Liability
A it. 1. Manufacturer's Liability
1. A manufacturer is liable for dam ages caused by the defects of its
product.32
It appears that on the issue of liability the rule is very similar to the
corresponding common law doctrine. In New York, for example, a strict
liability cause of action lies where a manufacturer places on the market a
product which has a defect that causes harm.33
The typical defendant, in the original language text of the Decree, is
the produttore. The English version of the Directive refers to the
"producer." This writing, however, adopts the term "manufacturer" for
consistency with the terminology used in American products liability law.
Because it states simply that "[a] manufacturer is liable . . .," article
1 enacts the Directive's intent to dispense with the need to make a
determination of negligence to attribute liability.34 The plaintiff need prove
only damages, the defect and the causal connection between the defect and
damages, and is not required to prove that the defendant manufactured the
product in question.35 This basic requirement clearly exists, however,
pursuant to the general provision on the burden of proof expressed in the
Civil Code: the party seeking enforcement of a right has the burden of
proving the facts on which the claim is based.36 The Tribunale of Monza,
in the first two decisions in which it applied the Decree, included in its
32. Decree No. 224 art. 1.
33. Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Division of Package Machinery Co., 403 N.E.2d 440
(N.Y. 1980) (citing Codling v. Paglia, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628 (N.Y. 1973)).
34. ALPA, supra note 12, at 250; Ponzanelli, supra note 18, at 509-10. Cf. C.C. art.
2043 (requires at least negligent conduct).
35. Decree No. 224 art. 8.
36. C.c. art. 2697.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
opinion an explicit reference to evidence that proved that the defendant
manufactured the product.37 In New York, unless there is testimonial or
documentary evidence which would support at least an inference that the
defendant manufactured the product, the complaint must be dismissed.38
As the Decree does not specifically treat the issue of causation, this
element will be evaluated on the basis of the general principles applicable
to negligence actions. Att the antecedents which necessarily contributed,
whether directly or indirectly, to an event such that without them the event
would not have occurred are to be deemed its causes.39
The Decree's language that imposes strict liability on manufacturers
is broad. To properly understand the provision it is necessary to read
article 1 together with the definitions of "product" (article 2) and
"manufacturer" (article 3), and with the provisions that concern
defectiveness (article 5), exclusion of liability (article 6), contributory
negligence (article 10), and recoverable damages (article 11).
2. The Potential Plaintiffs
Because the Directive focuses on consumer protection, the notion of
"harmed party,"' and therefore the potential plaintiff, is quite clearly
limited to natural persons. A more uncertain issue is whether "harmed
party" includes a bystander, that is, a person who was not a user or
consumer of the product. The Decree does not suggest a distinction among
harmed parties to exclude bystanders. 4' The only limitation on recoverable
damages is the definition of the type of damages recoverable.42
Accordingly, a bystander should have the same rights to damages as a user
or consumer of the product. Interestingly, since the American Law
Institute noted that the American courts had not gone beyond allowing
recovery to users and consumers, it expressed neither approval nor
disapproval of expansion of the rule to permit recovery by casual
37. Tentori v. Soc. Rossin, Trib. Monza, 21 luglio 1993, Foro It. 1994, I, 251, 256;
Lissoni v. DeBernardi, Trib. Monza, 11 settembre 1995, RESP. CIV. PREV., 371, 374 (1996).
38. D'Amico v. Manufacttrers Hanover Trust Co., 569 N.Y.S.2d 962, 964 (App. Div.
1991).
39. Rigotti v. Wessanentalia, Cass. civ,. sez. 111, 16 giugno 1984, n.3609, cited in
MARIO ABATE ET AL, IL CODICE CIVILE COMMENTATO CON LA GIURISPRUDENZA 1523
(5th ed. 1991) [hereinafter IL CODICE CIVILE]. However, where a single antecedent was
aZre sfficient to cause tte evJent, al o'he aecedents aye ITTZenet. Id.
40. Decree No. 224 art. 8.
41. Chiara Marti, Prova, in NUOVE LEGGI civ., 593-94.
42. Decree No. 224 art. 11.
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strangers.4 3 The New York Court of Appeals, however, held that the
manufacturer of a defective product may be held liable to an innocent
bystander on a theory of strict products liability.
44
3. The Potential Defendants
Art. 3. Manufacturer
1. A manufacturer is the maker of the finished product or of a
component thereof as well as the manufacturer of the raw material.
2. With regard to agricultural products of the soil and the products
of animal husbandry, fishing and hunting, the manufacturer is the
person responsible for their transformation.
3. A manufacturer is also the person who appears to be such through
the application of its name, trademark or other distinctive sign on the
product or its packaging.
4. One who, in the exercise of a commercial activity, imports into
the European Community any product for sale, rent, lease, or other
form of distribution, and one who appears as the importer into the
European Community by affixing its name, trademark or other
distinctive sign on the product or its packaging, is subject to the same
liability as the manufacturer.4'
The Decree, like the Directive, focuses on the manufacturer or
producer as the typical defendant. This is a significant difference with the
American strict products liability system, which refers to the special
liability of a "seller"'46-defuied in the Restatement commentary as
referring to any manufacturer, wholesale or retail dealer, or distributor.47
To protect consumers, the Decree subjects all manufacturers involved in
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A cmt. o (1965).
44. Codling v. Paglia, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628 (N.Y. 1973).
45. Decree No. 224 art. 3.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A (1965).
47. Id. cmt. f. Persons held subject to strict liability for placing a defective product in
the marketplace have included commercial lessors, Winckel v. Atlantic Rentals & Sales,
Inc., 557 N.Y.S.2d 951, 954 (App. Div. 1990), exclusive marketing agents which did not
take actual possession, title or control of the product, Brumbaugh v. CEJJ, Inc., 547
N.Y.S.2d 699, 701-02 (App. Div. 1989), and, admittedly in view of special circumstances,
even brokers, Weber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 630 F.Supp. 285, 287-88 (D.N.J. 1986).
Policy reasons underlying the choice of defendants subject to strict liability are discussed
in Brumbaugh, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
the production process to liability without fault.48 Such liability extends to
persons who supply a product only where its producer cannot be
identified.49
The manufacturer of a defective component part or raw material is
strictly liable for the damages caused by its product.50 Interestingly, the
Restatement expresses no opinion on whether strict liability is applicable
to the seller of a compottent part of a product to be assembled." In New
York, however, a cause of action in strict products liability may be
asserted against the manufacturer of a component part.52
It is further apparent, although not plainly stated in the Decree, that
the manufacturer of the finished product is also strictly liable for damages
caused by a defective component or raw material manufactured by
another. 53 The same rule has been applied in New York. 54 The Decree,
however, creates a right of contribution against other liable parties. 55
The Decree also imposes strict liability on the apparent manufacturer,
that is, the person whose name, trademark or other distinctive sign appears
on the product. 56 This formality appears to be sufficient for strict liability,
without the need to also allege either the trademark owner's involvement
in distribution of the product or its exercise of control over the product's
quality. In New York, instead, ownership and registration of a trademark
is not a sufficient predicate for strict products liability.57 However,
although not formally involved as a manufacturer, designer or seller, a
trademark licensor may be subject to strict liability for injuries caused by
a defective product where it has had significant involvement in distribution
or is capable of exercising control over quality.5" In addition, a general
"apparent manufacturer" doctrine exists in New York, but it applies only
where the circumstances cast doubt on the identity of the true manufacturer
48. Decree No. 224 art. 3.
49. Id. art. 4(1).
50. Decree No. 224 art. 3(1).
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A caveat 3 (1965).
52. Icelandic Airlines, Inc. v. Canadair, Ltd., 428 N.Y.S.2d 393, 399 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1980).
53. Onofrio Troiano, Produttore, in NUOVE LEGGI CIV., 518-19.
54. Delzotti v. American LaFrance, 579 N.Y.S.2d 33, 34 (App. Div. 1992).
55. Deciee No. 224 an. 92).
56. Id. art 3(3).
57. Porter v. LSB Indus., Inc., 600 N.Y.S.2d 867, 871 (App. Div. 1993).
58. Harrison v. ITT Corp., 603 N.Y.S.2d 826 (App. Div. 1993).
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because the party's name appears on the product or the party is involved
in the manufacture, sale or distribution of the product.59
It should be noted that the Decree does not permit the apparent
manufacturer to avoid strict liability by indicating the actual manufacturer.
This is a defense available only to the seller.' However, the apparent
manufacturer should be able to assert the right of contribution against other
liable parties.
61
Strict liability is also imposed on one who has imported a product into
the European Union for commercial distribution. 62 The Decree does not
permit the importer, who is subject to strict liability as a "manufacturer,"
to avoid liability by indicating the actual foreign manufacturer; nor does
the Decree exempt the foreign manufacturer from strict liability.63 As a
result, the importer and the foreign manufacturer are jointly liable in
accordance with article 9 of the Decree.'
Art. 4. Seller's Liability
1. When the manufacturer is unknown, the seller who sold the product
in the exercise of a commercial activity is subject to the same liability
if the seller fails to provide a notice to the harmed party, within three
months from the request, which contains the name and domicile of the
manufacturer or of the person that supplied the product to the seller.
2. The request must be in writing and must specify the product that
caused the harm, the place and, with reasonable approximation, the
date of purchase; it must also offer the product for inspection, if the
product still exists.
3. If the service of the complaint is not preceded by the request
mentioned in paragraph 2, the defendant may provide the notice
within three months from service of the complaint.
4. In any case, upon application by the seller made at the first hearing
of the trial court, the judge, if the circumstances so justify, may set
59. King v. Eastman Kodak Co., 631 N.Y.S.2d 832, 833 (App. Div. 1995); Fletcher v.
Atex, Inc., 861 F.Supp. 242, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 400 (1965)).
60. Decree No. 224 art. 4.
61. Id. art. 9(2).
62, Id. art. 3(4).
63. It should be noted that Directive 85/374 art. 3(2), at 31 provides that an importer
shall be deemed a producer "[w]ithout prejudice to the liability of the producer."
64. DeBerardinis, supra note 4, at 684.
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another deadline not to exceed three months for the notice provided
in paragraph 1.
5. The person indicated as the manufacturer or the prior supplier may
be joined in the action pursuant to article 106 of the code of civil
procedure, and the defendant seller may be dismissed from the action
if the person indicated appears and does not deny that it was the
manufacturer or the prior supplier. In the case contemplated by
paragraph 3, the defendant may ask the court to direct the plaintiff to
reimburse the costs resulting from its being summoned in the action.
6. The provisions of this article apply to any product imported into the
European Community when the importer is unknown, even if the
manufacturer is known. 65
The term "seller" was chosen to translate fornitore, which in the
literal context of article 4 implies the most proximate supplier to the
harmed consumer: the retailer. The expression, however translated,
clearly is intended to refer to distributors as well as retailers.66 While the
Decree does not define the term, it is reasonable to assume that the
reference to fornitore was intended to include businesses engaged in any
form of distribution.67 Although it is not immediately clear from the
language of the Decree, it is likely that a lessor whose business it is to put
goods into the stream of commerce by leases, instead of through sales
transactions, is within the scope of article 4.68 It appears more uncertain
whether a marketing agent or sales representative might risk being held
strictly liable as a "seller." 69 It is even more uncertain for a broker.7'
65. Decree No. 224 art. 4.
66. The English text of the Directive uses the term "supplier." Directive 85/374 art.
3(3), at 31.
67. See Decree No. 224 art. 3(4) (person who imports for sale, rent, lease or other form
of distribution); Nicola Mazzia, Responsabiliti delfomitore, in NUOVE LEGGI CIV., 531,
534.
68. In the United States, lessors may be held strictly liable in tort. See e.g., Cintrone
v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 212 A.2d 769, 778 (N.J. 1965) (stating that nature
of U-drive-it business is such that lessor's responsibility may properly be stated in strict
liability in tort).
69. This business activity is governed by C.c. arts. 1742-1758, Del Contratto di
Agenzia.
70. This business activity is governed by C.c. arts. 1754-1765, Della Mediazione. In
the United States, brokers may be held strictly liable for defective products where, e.g.,
they are "not an ordinary brolcer." Weber v. Johns-Manville Corp, 630 F.Supp. 285, 287
(D.N.J. 1986). It seems safe to say that a mere middleman may not be subject to strict
liability. Oscar Mayer Corp. v. Mincing Trading Corp., 744 F.Supp. 79 (D.N.J. 1990).
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In the United States, the Restatement postulates that a "seller" is
strictly liable.7' The Restatement explains that the rule applies to any
manufacturer, wholesaler, retail dealer, or distributor.7 2 In New York, a
seller that sells a product in the normal course of its business, in addition
to the manufacturer, may be held strictly liable,73 as may others who are
responsible for placing the defective product in the marketplace.
7 4
American courts have held that even a regular seller of used products may
be strictly liable.7 5
The Decree, however, clearly limits strict liability to manufacturers
and, because they are their legal equivalents, to importers of products into
the European Union.7 6  The legislative history explains that the only
purpose for imposing strict liability on sellers is to induce them to reveal
the identity of the manufacturer, thereby placing pressure on the
manufacturer to make a safer product.77 Accordingly, article 4 attempts
to strike a just balance between the interests of consumers and sellers. It
creates a series of rules and conditions that tend to limit the situations in
which a seller, instead of the manufacturer, may be held strictly liable.
The Decree's approach is to permit a harmed party to go back ultimately
to the first link in the distribution chain and seek from that first link the
entire recovery.7" To this end the harmed party may well make the
prescribed request 79 to any intermediate link in the distribution chain of
which the harmed party is aware. It is not clear whether-in situations
where the seller is unknown, for instance where the plaintiff is a bystander
or is a non-purchaser user-it would be possible to establish the identity
of a manufacturer by circumstantial evidence."°
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A (1965).
72. Id. cmt. f.
73. Sukljian v. Charles Ross & Son Co., 503 N.E.2d 1358, 1360 (N.Y. 1986).
74. Brumbaugh v. CEJJ, Inc., 547 N.Y.S.2d 699, 701 (App. Div. 1989).
75. Stiles v. Batavia Atomic Horseshoes, Inc., 579 N.Y.S.2d 790, 792-93 (App. Div.
1992), reversed on other grounds 613 N.E.2d 572; Santiago v. E.W. Bliss Div., Gulf and
Western Mfg. Co., 492 A.2d 1089, 1095 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1985).
76. See Decree No. 224 art. 4.
77. Mazzia, supra note 67, at 531. In the United States, there is the assumption that
retailers, distributors and others who are later in the stream of commerce are able to place
pressure on the manufacturer to produce safe products through indemnification clauses.
See e.g., Oscar Mayer Corp., v. Mincing Trading Corp., 744 F.Supp. 79, 84 (D.N.J. 1990)
(stating that party that is in contractual relationship with manufacturer or supplier is in
position to exert pressure to ensure safety of product).
78. Mazzia, supra note 67, at 542.
79. Decree No. 224 arts. 4(1), (2).
80. A plaintiff may do so in New York, as long as the circumstantial evidence
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Thus, in compliance with the Directive, the Decree exempts a seller
from strict liability if the seller cooperates with the harmed party by
providing either the name of the manufacturer or information useful in the
identification of the manufacturer, such as the name of the prior supplier. 1
When the manufacturer is known, moreover, the seller is not subject to
strict liability even if they do not cooperate with the harmed party. 82 Still,
the setter may be liable under traditional negligence and contract rules.
A seller cannot be strictly liable unless the seller sold the product in
the exercise of a commercial activity.3 This condition would permit
broader reach of strict liability than similar qualifications in the United
States which require that the product in issue be sold by one who is
regularly engaged in the business of selling the product. " It is possible to
construe the less restrictive "in the exercise of a commercial activity" to
include any transfer for consideration" even if such transfers occur
independently of the seller's normal course of business.
The Decree does not specify whether it is the harmed party or the
seller that has the burden of proof. The Decree allocates the burdens of
proof between the harmed party and the manufacturer, and the
manufacturer must prove the facts that exclude strict liability. 6 Moreover,
the condition that triggers a seller's strict liability is analogous to the
circumstances that would impose liability on a manufacturer. 87
Accordingly, it is safe to say that just as the manufacturer has the burden
of proving the facts that exclude its strict liability,88 including the
circumstances concerning distribution in the exercise of a business activity,
so also should the burden be on the seller to prove that the distribution of
the product did not occur in the exercise of a commercial activity.
establishes that it is reasonably probable that the defendant was the source of the offending
product. Healey v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 663 N.E.2d 901 (N.Y. 1996).
81. Decree No. 224 art. 4(1); Directive 85/374 art. 3(3), at 31.
82. Decree No. 224 art. 1; see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
83. Decree No. 224 art. 4(1). The Directive does not specify this requirement.
Directive 85/374 art. 3(3), at 31.
84. See RESTATEMENT (SEiCOND) OF TORTS § 402 A cmt. f (1965). In New York see
Sukljian v. Charles Ross & Son Co., 503 N.E.2d at 1358, 1361 (N.Y. 1986) (holding strict
liability may not be imposed on casual or occasional seller of used machinery who sells
the equipment as part of a sale of surplus property).
9S. As was the ease in Sukiikian, 5q3 N.E.2d at 1361.
86. Decree No. 224 art. 8,
87. See id. arts. 6 and 8.
88. Id. art. 8(2).
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The Decree is silent also as to the form the written request for
damages served upon the seller must or may take. In view of the three-
month deadline given the seller to respond to the request,89 however, a
prudent plaintiff should serve the request by certified mail or other means
that would provide proof of the date the period began to run. For the
Italian legal system, moreover, the nature of the request places it among
the atti ricettizi, that is, notices that become effective upon receipt.'
Accordingly, adequate proof of the date the period begins to run would
require a return receipt where the plaintiff uses certified mail.
Nor does the Decree specify whether the harmed party must explicitly
ask for the name of the manufacturer, importer, or other party strictly
liable under the Decree, or whether the harmed party must make more
than a generic demand for damages. Because the Directive does not
require the harmed party to ask for the manufacturer's name, 91 it is
reasonable to assume that the Italian lawmaker intended that a request be
effective for the purposes of article 4 so long as it contains a demand for
damages in addition to the information indicated in paragraph 2.92 This
appears to be supported by paragraph 3, which concerns the situation
where the harmed party makes no request but directly commences an
action against the seller. 93 Even a demand for damages that is not
explicitly premised on the Decree is likely to be deemed an effective
request that triggers the seller's notice requirement. However, the demand
must be worded in a way that suggests that the seller is subject to liability
on the same theory as the manufacturer, or it must imply that the harmed
party is unaware of the manufacturer's identity.94
The request to the seller must offer the allegedly defective product for
inspection. 95  This requirement does not appear in the Directive. 96
Presumably it is designed for the requested seller's benefit, as it might
provide the seller with information leading to the identity of the
manufacturer.97 A similar requirement that the product be offered for
89. Id. art. 4(1).
90. C.c. arts. 1334 and 1335; see e.g., Cass. civ. sez. II, 5 giugno 1987, n. 4893, cited
in IL CODICE CIVILE, supra note 39, at 1119 (buyer's notice of defects is atto ricettizio).
91. Directive 85/374 art. 3(3), at 31; cf. Decree No.224 art. 4(1).
92. Mazzia, supra note 67, at 537.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Decree No. 224 art. 4(2).
96. Directive 85/374 art. 3(3), at 31.
97. For an American case where the product's preservation was important for this
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
inspection exists in the United States, since either party may incur
sanctions for failure to preserve critical evidence.98
Another issue is whether a seller must comply with paragraph 3 when
it is served with a complaint in which the harmed party claims damages
but does not set forth a specific legal theory (e.g., contract, negligence or
strict liability). 99 Italian courts have suggested that a complaint that fails
to indicate a legal theory should be construed as being based on all
possible theories that would entitle the plaintiff to recover." To be
prudent, therefore, the defendant seller should provide the plaintiff with the
notice in accordance with paragraph 3. It should be noted that although
the seller may be able to avoid strict liability, they may still be subject to
liability in negligence or in contract.
The Decree offers the seller a second chance to provide the notice that
would permit the seller to avoid strict liability.' 0' In appropriate
circumstances, the court may extend the deadline "in any case," that is,
whether the seller received a request from the harmed party or whether the
seller was immediately served with a complaint and in either case the seller
failed to provide the notice. 0 2 The legislative history explains that this
provision was added to avoid excessive rigidity and to take into account the
difficulty in quickly determining the source of the product, especially when
much time passed from the sale. 03
Thus, a court may postpone the deadline for the seller to provide the
notice contemplated in paragraph 1.°4 Circumstances that a court might
consider in exercising its discretion would include: the difficulty in
purpose, see Healey v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 622 N.Y.S.2d 246, 247-48 (App. Div.
1995) (Murphy, P.J., dissenting in part), rev'd, 633 N.E.2d 901 (N.Y. 1996).
98. See Abar v. Freightliner Corp., 617 N.Y.S.2d 209, 212-13 (App. Div. 1994)
(providing that spoliation sanctions appropriate where litigant intentionally or negligently
disposes of crucial items of evidence before adversary had opportunity to inspect them).
99. For a general description of an Italian civil proceeding, see Angelo P. Sereni, Basic
Features of Civil Procedure in Italy:A Comparative Study, I AM. J. COMP. L. 373, 378-85
(1952).
100. Mazzia, supra note 67, at 536. In this respect, there appears to be substantive
similarity with the flexible pleading rules in American courts as exemplified by N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 3017(a) (McKinney 1990).
101. Decree No. 224 art. 4(4).
102. Id.
103. Mazzia, supra note 67, at 540 n.32. It should be noted that the Decree does not
specify a time within which the harmed party must make the request. In theory, therefore,
the request may be made well into the third year of the statute of limitations.
104. Decree No. 224 art. 4(4).
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identifying the manufacturer; the time that passed from the sale and from
the plaintiff's request; the non-delivery of the request to the seller;
improper service of the complaint; and other circumstances that may have
prevented the seller from providing the notice within the statutory
period."0 5 Moreover, in the event of the seller's failure to appear at the
first hearing, the court may allow the non-appearing defendant seller to
show that the default was excusable and permit that seller at a later hearing
to apply for an extension of the deadline to provide the notice.' 6
A plaintiff or defendant may join or implead another party into an
action if the claims also concern that party or if the impleading party has
an indemnification claim against the impleaded party.107 The seller is not
dismissed immediately upon providing the name of the manufacturer or
prior supplier, because the seller is entitled to dismissal only if the joined
or inpleaded manufacturer or prior supplier appears and does not deny the
allegations.0'° The burden of proof provisions set forth in article 8 should
apply to this issue as well.109 Accordingly, the joined or impleaded party
must prove it was neither the manufacturer nor the prior supplier. Until
the court makes a finding on this issue, the seller would remain potentially
strictly liable and would not be entitled to a dismissal.
In the event the seller fails to provide the notice within the statutory
period or extended period granted by the court and, consequently, becomes
subject to strict liability, the question arises whether the seller remains in
this position if the name of the manufacturer becomes known later. It has
been said that to release the seller from strict liability at that point would
conflict with the article 4 procedure that permits a seller to avoid strict
liability and with the limitations contained in that procedure. 110 According
to this approach once the Decree's conditions have been met for the
seller's strict liability, the seller remains strictly liable even when the
harmed person later becomes aware of the manufacturer's name. In this
event the seller and manufacturer would be jointly and severally liable. 1
Should the plaintiff fail to join the manufacturer in the action, the seller
105. Mazzia, supra note 67, at 540-41.
106. C.P.c. art. 294.
107. Id. art. 106 (to which Decree No. 224 art. 4(5) refers).
108. Decree No. 224 art. 4(5).
109. Mazzia, supra note 67, at 541.
110. Id. at 542.
111. Decree No. 224 art. 9(1).
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
may implead it or bring a separate action against the manufacturer for
complete indemnification for its share of strict liability.
112
The seller that provides the name and domicile of the manufacturer or
prior supplier within the statutory period or longer period given by the
court avoids strict liability even though the manufacturer or prior supplier
is judgment-proof, e.g., by death, dissolution or bankruptcy." 3 It would
also appear that despite anx Italian court's inability to obtain personal
jurisdiction over the specified manufacturer or prior supplier (a highly
unlikely situation, given the new jurisdiction rules4), the seller would
similarly avoid strict liability. However, in situations where the
manufacturer or prior supplier is no longer at the indicated domicile and
cannot be found, it has been opined that the seller remains strictly liable." 5
4. Defective Product
Art. 2. Product
1. For the purposes of these provisions, a product is any movable
good, even if it is incorporated in another good whether movable or
immovable.
2. Electricity is a product.
3. Excluded from the definition are the agricultural products of the
soil and the products of animal husbandry, fishing and hunting that
have not been transformed. Transformation is the application to the
product of a treatment that either modifies its characteristics or adds
substances. Packaging and any other treatment of an industrial nature
are deemed transformation when such packaging and treatment make
it difficult for the consumer to examine the product or create an
expectation in the consumer as to the product's safety.'16
This provision limits the scope of strict liability. The defective
products that afford this special remedy are "movable goods" and
electricity. The civil law divides property into immovable and movable
goods. 1 7 The limitation of applicability to movable goods," 8 when viewed
112. Mazzia, supra note 67, at 542.
113. Id. at 543.
114. Law No. 218 art. 3(2) extended the long arm jurisdiction created by the 1968
Brussels Convention o Teach deeDedants not domiciled in the Euyopean Union.
115. Mazzia, supra note 67, at 543.
116. Decree No. 224 art. 2.
117. C.c. art. 812 provides that immovable goods are land, sources and bodies of water,
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with the provisions that refer to lines of products" 9 and to distributors and
importers120 suggests that the Italian lawmaker intended the Decree to apply
mainly to mass produced consumer products."' A semi-finished product
or raw material may also be a "product."' 2
For the purposes of the Decree electricity is a product. 
2 3
Accordingly, under its provisions manufacturers of electricity may be held
strictly liable for damages resulting from defects in the electricity supplied.
Of interest is the exclusion of "non-transformed," or unprocessed,
agricultural produce, fish and game from the definition of "product." The
Directive gave each member state discretion to insert this exclusion in its
national law.1 24 The Italian legislature decided to enact the exclusion in
view of the prevailing distribution methods of agricultural produce, fish
and game. For, as previously indicated, the Decree imposes strict liability
upon a retailer unless the retailer identifies the manufacturer or supplier of
the product. 125 Because the organization of agricultural produce, fish and
game distribution in Italy makes it extremely difficult if not impossible to
trace the manufacturer or wholesaler, it was found appropriate to protect
the retailer from liability more properly attributable to the manufacturer by
excluding these products from the rules of strict liability.126 On the other
trees, buildings even if temporarily connected to land, and every other thing that naturally
or artificially is incorporated in land. Movable goods are all other property. Id.
Consequently, for example, because a building is an immovable good a contractor may not
be held strictly liable for defects in the building.
118. Decree No. 224 art. 2(1).
119. Id. art. 5(3)
120. Id. art. 4.
121. Mazzia, supra note 67, at 514. The policy to protect the American consuming
public pervades Section 402 A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
122. This is clear from Decree No. 224 art. 2(1), when read with art. 3(1). New York
courts have recognized that component parts may be "products" for strict liability purposes.
Munger v. Heider Mfg. Corp., 456 N.Y.S.2d 271 (App. Div. 1982).
123. Decree No. 224 art. 2(2). In New York, electricity is not a "product" for purposes
of strict products liability. Bowen v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 294, 590 N.Y.S.2d
628, 629 (App. Div. 1992). In Bowen, where the issue was assertedly of first impression,
the court examined case law from other jurisdictions holding instead that electricity is a
product.
124. Directive 85/374 art. 15(1)(a), at 32.
125. Decree No. 224 art. 4.
126. Pardolesi, supra note 7, at 516. The retailer may be liable, however, on negligence
or contract theories. In the United States, strict liability may apply even to unprocessed
foods, such as poisonous mushrooms. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A cmt.
e (1965).
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
hand, if the agricultural produce, fish and game products have been
transformed in the manner specified in the Decree, the person responsible
for the transformation will be strictly liable.127
Art. 5. Defective Product
1. A product is defective when it does not provide the safety that
reasonably would be expected taking into account all the
circumstances, including:
a) the manner in which the product was placed into the stream of
commerce, its appearance, its patent characteristics, and the
instructions and the warnings furnished;
b) the use for which the product may reasonably be intended and
the uses which, in view thereof, may reasonably be foreseen;
c) the time when the product was placed into the strewn of
commerce.
2. A product shall not be deemed defective solely because an
improved product was at any time placed into the strewn of
commerce.
3. A product is defective if it does not provide the safety normally
provided by other products of the same model line. 1
28
This provision has been said to create three categories of
"defectiveness" that support a manufacturer's strict liability: defective
design (paragraph 1), manufacturing (paragraph 3) and "information"
(paragraph 1(a)). 129 This is similar to the law in American jurisdictions,
where "defectiveness" may be a result of 1) a mistake in the
manufacturing process, 2) an improper design, or 3) the failure to provide
adequate warnings regarding the use of the product.13°
A defective product is, first, one which is unsafe as a result of
defective design. 131 Here the concept of defective design formally includes
the category of "defective information" or failure to furnish adequate
instructions and warnings.13 2 Paragraph 2, which implicitly distinguishes
127. Decree No. 224 art. 3(2).
128. Id. art. 5.
129. Id. art. 5; Maria Leoriarda Loi, Prodotto difettoso, in NUOVE LEGGI CIV., 543, 544.
130. Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 208 (N.Y. 1983).
131. Decree No. 224 art(5)(1).
132. Instead, in the United States, failure to warn has been viewed as a defect separate
from that of defective design. Voss, 450 N.E.2d at 207. A duty to warn exists where the
intended or foreseeable use of the product presents a hazard not normally contemplated by
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between safety and perfection, clarifies that a product is not defective
merely because an improved product was placed into the stream of
commerce. 13' The non-improved product is not necessarily, for that reason
alone, unsafe. A product is defective also when it does not offer the safety
provided by other products of the same model line, suggesting a
manufacturing defect.134  Indeed, the manufacturer does not have any
opportunity to argue that the product can provide the safety that reasonably
would be expected of it despite the manufacturing defect. 135 On the other
hand, allegations of design defects can be rebutted by showing that in view
of the relevant circumstances the product is reasonably safe. 1
36
Paragraph 1, concerning defective design, substantially reproduces the
"consumer-expectation" test contained in the Directive. 13' Thus a product
is defectively designed if it does not provide the safety that a user or
consumer would reasonably expect of it in view of the circumstances
mentioned in letters a), b), and c) of paragraph 1. It is interesting to
examine paragraph 1 in the light of American law and the few Italian
decisions that so far have applied its provisions. The factors included
under letter a) pertain to the product's apparent qualities, including
instructions and warnings, as these may bear upon a consumer's ability
to perceive the product's potential risks. As already noted, in the United
States, failure to warn is treated as a defect separate from that of defective
design. 138 Moreover, with regard to defective information, to determine
whether the instructions and warnings were adequate to communicate to the
consumer particular risks of harm, the relevant factors would include the
characteristics of the likely users of the product, the advertising messages
as to its safety, and the relative ease in obtaining the product. 139 In one of
a foreseeable user. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A cmt. i (1965); Landrine
v. Mego Corp., 464 N.Y.S.2d 516, 518 (App. Div. 1983).
133. Decree No. 224 art. 5(2); for New York see Coverv. Cohen, 461 N.E.2d 864, 869
(N.Y. 1984) (distinguishing between "reasonably safe" and "the safest possible" product).
134. Decree No. 224 art. 5(3).
135. Ponzanelli, supra note 11, at 257.
136. Id. Similarly, in New York, a manufacturing flaw is a sufficient basis to hold the
manufacturer liable without regard to fault, while in a design defect case the reasonableness
of the manufacturer's conduct is considered in light of a number of situational and policy-
driven factors. Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 735 (N.Y. 1995).
137. Directive 85/374 art. 6(1), at 31.
138. Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1983).
139. Loi, supra note 129, at 554-55. An interesting aspect of failure to warn cases in
New York is the "informed intermediary defense" available to drug manufacturers.
Because a prescription drug must be administered through a prescribing physician,
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
the first decisions to apply the Decree, the Tribunale of Milano held that
a bunk bed that collapsed causing serious personal injury was both
defectively designed and sold with insufficient instructions for its
installation."4 The court noted the technical consultant's finding that the
product's design rendered it particularly unstable and its installation
mandated the use of wall hooks.' It also noted the technical consultant's
opinion that because an improper installation was foreseeable, the product
required prominently displayed instructions directing the user to anchor the
bunk bed to the wall.142
Letter b) suggests that the manufacturer must consider the spectrum
of reasonably foreseeable uses of the product by its reasonably foreseeable
users.'4 3 Thus if a product is designed for the use of children, the
manufacturer will have to consider that the imagination, curiosity and other
traits of these users may invite them to use the product in a variety of
unintended manners. On the other hand, if a product is intended for
trained members of a trade, the extent of foreseeable misuses is
narrower. 1" In New York, the foreseeability of a misuse does not appear
among the factors to be considered in a strict liability action to determine
whether a product was defectively designed.' 45 On the other hand, an
action for "negligent design" in New York leads to an analysis similar to
that directed by article 5(l)(b) of the Decree. In New York, a
manufacturer is obligated to exercise that degree of care in his plan or
design of a product so as to avoid any unreasonable risk of harm to anyone
who is likely to be exposed to the danger when the product is used in the
manner for which the product was intended as well as an unintended yet
warnings for these drugs are intended for the physician who acts as an "informed
intermediary" between the manufacturer and the patient, and thus the manufacturer's duty
to caution against a drug's side effects is fulfilled by giving adequate warning through the
prescribing physician, instead of directly to the patient. Martin v. Hacker, 628 N.E.2d
1308, 1311 (N.Y. 1993).
140. Bassi v. Poliedro di Guzzo e C. s.n.c., Trib. Milano, 13 aprile 1995, DANNO E
RESP. 381, 381-82 (1996).
141. Id. at 381.
142. Id. at 381-82.
143. Loi, supra note 129, at 554.
144. Id. at 544 n.37.
145. Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 208-09 (N.Y. 1983).
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reasonably foreseeable use. 146 A plaintiff's misuse may be relevant in a
strict liability action in New York on the issue of comparative fault.
147
The issue of whether it would have been reasonable for a
manufacturer to anticipate a given use will present Italian judges who apply
article 5(1)(b) of the Decree with a new challenge. Italy lacks the depth
of experience which the common law developed in applying the
reasonableness standard to evaluate conduct. 48  A recent Corte di
Cassazione decision anticipates the likely difficulties. In Braghini v.
Comune di San Bartolomeo al Mare,149 a 12-year-old boy who was using
a swing in a standing position lost his balance and instinctively attempted
to grasp the swing's hinges to prevent his falling.150 The hinge injured his
left hand with the resulting loss of the thumb.' 5' He sued the swing's
manufacturer alleging the swing's dangerous design (the hinge where the
swing's metal rods were attached was sharp and did not have a guard to
prevent the insertion of fingers) and sued the municipality that owned thepark with the swing.152 The manufacturer failed to make an appearance,
and the municipality's answer alleged that the boy's unusual and
unforeseeable use of the swing had caused the incident (he stood not on the
swing's "chair" but on its arm rests). 153 The action was dismissed by the
Tribunale of Imperia, and the Corte d'appello of Genoa affirmed. 5 4 The
Corte d'appello held that the sole cause of the incident was the manner in
which the boy used the swing - totally unusual and unrelated to the typical
way in which swings are used.' 55 The Corte di Cassazione addressed the
question of whether the injury was caused by a defect of the swing or
directly and independently by the manner in which the boy used the
swing.' 56 To determine whether the swing was defective the Corte di
146. Micallef v. Miehle Co., Div. of Miehle-Goss Dexter, Inc., 348 N.E.2d 571, 577-79
(N.Y. 1976).
147. Voss, 450 N.E.2d at 210.
148. Francesco Caringella, La ragionevolezza dell'uso della 'res'quale condizione della
responsabiliti del produttore: il caso di prodotti destinati a minori, Foro It. 1996, 1, 954,
955-56. The standard is not that new, however, in Italian criminal law. Id. at 956-57.
149. Cass. civ., 29 settembre 1995, n.10274, Foro It. 1996, I, 954.
150. Id. at 955-56.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 956.
154. Cass. civ., 29 settembre 1995, n.10274, Foro It. 1996, 1, 957.
155. Id. at 958-59.
156. Id. at 960.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Cassazione applied the Decree's article 5(1) test even though the incident,
which occurred in 1979, was not governed by the Decree. 157 The Corte
di Cassazione stated the test as follows: an injury is caused by a product's
defect if the product was used in the manner which the manufacturer could
reasonably foresee and the user's conduct came within the class of
reasonably foreseeable behavior, unless the user could know that certain
of those uses were dangerous . 58 The Corte di Cassazione agreed with the
Corte d'appello that the manufacturer could not have reasonably foreseen
that a 12-year-old boy would have stood on the swing's arm rests. 159 It
ruled that when a product is unsafe owing to the user's conduct which the
manufacturer could not reasonably foresee, this lack of safety is not
sufficient to make the manufacturer liable." 6  Moreover, the Corte di
Cassazione added that it was proper to omit to request a technical
consultant's opinion on the dangerousness of the swing.
161
The application of the Decree's article 5(l)(b) in Braghini seems rash
because it can be argued that consideration of the boy's age and
intelligence would make it not unreasonable to expect the boy to use the
swing by standing on its arm rests. An arbitration tribuna t62 had handed
down a similarly dubious decision. It held that the normal use of the
product in question and the average education level of the potential users
of the product, but not also the possibility that it might be used by
someone other than the average consumer, are among the factors to be
considered in determining the dangerousness of a product of mass
consumption. In the first court decision that applied the Decree, Tentori
v. Soc. Rossin, the Tribunale of Monza held that a mountain bike was
defective owing to both the weak materials used and the bike user's
reasonable expectation that the mountain bike be sufficiently sturdy to
function in rugged terrain.'63 The court relied on the technical consultant's
findings that because it was reasonable for the defendant to foresee the
rugged use of the product, the defendant's design choice was defective.
164
Tentori was an easy case, because clearly a product is defective when its
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Cass. civ., 29 settembre 1995, n.10274, Foro It. 1996, I, 960.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 960-61.
162. Lodo arbitrale - Bologna, 14 gennaio 1991, RASSEGNA DIRMTO CIVILE IRASS.
DIR. CiV.] 649, 660 (March 1992).
163. Tentori v. Soc. Rossin, Trib. Monza, 21 luglio 1993, Foro It. 1994, I, 251, 259.
164. Id. at 257-58.
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commonly intended use results in injury; in Tentori the question of
whether the plaintiff's use of the mountain bike on rugged terrain was
reasonably foreseeable was not at issue.
Letter c) makes the time when the product was introduced into the
stream of commerce relevant to establish defective design. Time can bear
upon, inter alia, society's reasonable expectations of safety at that moment
and an individual consumer's expectations of the product's safety in view
of the amount of time it has been in use. Time is also relevant for the
"state of the art" defense. 165
A significant difference with American law is that the factors to be
considered in determining defective design do not include also cost or
price. The standard applied in New York to determine whether a product
was defectively designed is whether the product as designed was "not
reasonably safe" - that is, whether it is a product which, if the design
defect were known at the time of manufacture, a reasonable person would
conclude that the utility of the product did not outweigh the risk inherent
in marketing a product designed in that manner. 166 Under the New York
"risk-utility" test to determine whether the design makes the product
unreasonably dangerous, the risks inherent in the product as designed are
balanced against its utility and cost and against the utility and cost of
alternative designs." The New York Court of Appeals identified the
factors to be considered as including (1) the utility of the product to the
public as a whole and to the individual user, (2) the nature of the product -
that is, the likelihood that it will cause harm, (3) the availability of a safer
design, (4) the potential for designing and manufacturing the product so
that it is safer but remains functional and reasonably priced, (5) the ability
of the plaintiff to have avoided injury by careful use of the product, (6) the
degree of awareness of the potential danger of the product which
reasonably can be attributed to the plaintiff, and (7) the manufacturer's
ability to spread any cost related to improving the safety of the design. 
168
These factors are considered to determine whether the plaintiff has made
out a prima facie showing that the product was not reasonably safe.
169
That cost and price aspects are considered appears to provide defendants
with more arguments to contrast allegations of defective design.
165. See Decree No. 224 art. 6(1)(e).
166. Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 208 (N.Y. 1976).
167. 1 N.Y. P.J.I. 2:141 (Supp 1995).
168. Voss, 450 N.E.2d at 208-09.
169. Fallon v. Clifford B. Hannay & Son, Inc., 550 N.Y.S.2d 135, 137 (App. Div.
1989).
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Moreover, it would seem that the New York risk-utility test presents a
greater challenge to plaintiffs and would require more extensive use of
expert witnesses than the consumer expectation test directed by the Decree
in defective design cases.
5. Recoverable Damages
Art. 11. Recoverable Damages
1. It is possible to recover in accordance with the provisions of this
decree:
a) damages caused by death or personal injury;
b) damages consisting in the loss of or harm to property other
than the defective product itself, provided said property is of a
type normally intended for private use or consumption and was
mainly in this manner used by the harmed party.
2. Property damage is recoverable only to the extent it exceeds
750, 000 Lire."17
Article 11 reproduces substantially the entire article 9 of the Directive,
which achieved a compromise between greater protection for consumers
and a limitation of the types of harm for which damages may be claimed
under the Decree.17' In addition, because article 15(1) of the Decree
preserves the rights provided a plaintiff by other rules of law, article 11
supplements the general provisions on recoverable damages in negligence
actions. 
17 2
Letter a) of the first paragraph has been read to imply that recoverable
damages will be those generally recognized as having "patrimonial
nature," which include medical expenses and other economically
quantifiable consequences, as opposed to "moral damages." 73
Accordingly in the event of death, the decedent's heirs will have a claim,
by right of inheritance, for damages incurred by the decedent until the time
170. Decree No. 224 art. 11.
171. Pardolesi, supra note 7, at 629.
172. These provisions are found in articles 1223, 1226 and 1227 of the Civil Code. C.c.
art. 2056.
173. Pardolesi, supra note 7, at 629. For a series of views on the concepts of
"patrimonial" and "non patrimonial" damages see the comments to the decision of the
Constitutional Court of July 14, 1986, n.184, in DIRITTO DELLA INFORMAZIONE E DELL'
INFORMATICA [DIR. INF.] 725-83 (1986). An interesting comparison is that between
"patrimonial" damages and the "pecuniary" injuries recoverable by a decedent's distributee
under New York's EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 5-4.3(a).
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of death as well as a claim, in their individual capacities, to compensate
them for the loss of services and financial assistance from which the heirs
had benefited. And in the event of personal injury, the plaintiff would be
entitled to a recovery for medical expenses, loss of earnings and for a
series of items included in the concept of danno alla salute or "injury to
health. "'74 This concept includes items such as injury to a person's mental
and physical integrity,' 75 aesthetic injury,176 and loss of sexual relations.' 77
It is settled that the components of "injury to health" have "patrimonial
nature." 178  Where discrete damages included in "injury to health" are
without objective parameters for translation into monetary values, it is the
judge's duty, pursuant to articles 2056 and 1226 of the Civil Code, to
determine the amount equitably in view of all the circumstances. 1
79
A 1979 draft of the Directive contained a letter c) that included
concepts similar to pain and suffering among recoverable damages.' ° The
drafters of the Directive, however, chose to omit these "non-material"
damages from the Directive's reach and instead to permit the single
member states to determine whether or not such damages are
recoverable. 81  Although the Italian Constitutional Court noted that
damages which result from "injury to health" may include "moral
damages," e.g., physical or mental pain, it confirmed the rule of article
2059 of the Civil Code that these "moral damages" are non-recoverable
unless they result from a crime.8 2  The Court recently reiterated this
principle and explained that article 32 of the Italian Constitution, which
174. The development of the concept of "injury to health" is discussed in LA
VALUTAZIONE DEL DANNO ALLA SALUTE. PROFILI GIURIDICI, MEDICO-LEGALI ED
ASSICURATIVi 409-10 (Bargagna and Busnelli eds., 3d ed. 1995) [hereinafter LA
VALUTAZIONE DEL DANNO].
175. Cass. civ. sez. HI, 11 feb.1985, n.l 130, cited in LA VALUTAZIONE DEL DANNO,
supra note 173, at 409-10.
176. See Cass. civ. sez. III, 27 marzo 1987, n.2985, cited in IL CODICE CIVILE, supra
note 39, at 1042 (even a minor disfigurement of the face is an economic loss).
177. See, Cass. civ. sez. III, 11 nov.1986, n.6607, in ARCHIVIO CIVILE [ARCH. CIV.]
1988, 198, cited in IL CODICE CIVILE, supra note 39, at 1042 (although neither patrimonial
nor non-patrimonial in nature, loss of sexual relations is recoverable damage under C.C.
art. 2043).
178, Cass. civ. sez. III, 11 feb. 1985, n.l 130, cited in LA VALUTAZIONE DEL DANNO,
supra note 173, at 409-10.
179. Id.
180. Pardolesi, supra note 7, at 630.
181. Id.
182. Corte cost., 14 luglio 1986, n.184, DIR. INF., 825, 829 (1986).
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provides that health is a fundamental right, does not guarantee
compensation for "moral damages., 18 3 In practice, however, the courts
have awarded sums for "moral damages" where they found that it was
possible, on a theoretical level, to view the defendant's conduct as a crime.
The Tribunale of Milano recently held that the plaintiff who had sued a
manufacturer in strict products liability and a seller in negligence was
entitled to recover for past and future "moral damages" because the
defendants' culpable conduct "may in the abstract be deemed a crime." 4
Moreover, the Tribunale of Monza did not make any reference to a
potential criminal offense when it awarded "moral damages" for serious
injury in Lissoni v. DeBernardi.'85  Accordingly, in appropriate
circumstances, it will be possible to recover for "moral damages." It
should be noted, however, that amounts awarded for "moral damages" in
general are less than compensatory damages.' 86 Thus, it appears that
"moral damages" are not likely to be as significant as pain and suffering
in the United States.
Letter b) excludes a claim for economic loss consisting in the costs for
the repair of the defective product itself and, implicitly, for consequential
damages.'87 The choice is justified by the availability of a contract action
for breach of warranty and an action in negligence. 188 This approach
seems to be consistent with that of most American jurisdictions, where
recovery for economic loss is available under a warranty or breach of
contract claim.189 It should be noted, however, that while the Italian courts
appear to allow recovery for damage to the product under negligence rules,
this is not always true in American jurisdictions.190
183. Corte cost., 22 luglio 1996, n.293, Foro It..1996, I, 2963, 2968.
184. Bassi v. Poliedro di Guzzo e C. s.n.c., Trib. Milano, 13 aprile 1995, DANNO E
RESP. 381, 382 (1996).
185. Trib. Monza, 11 settembre 1995, RESP. CIV. PREV. 1996, 371, 375.
186. Compensatory damages were approximately 490 million lire and "moral damages"
were 150 million lire in Bassi, DANNO E RESP. at 382; compensatory damages amounted
to approximately 249 million lire and "moral damages" to 50 million lire in Lissoni, RESP.
CIV. PREV. at 375.
187. Decree No. 224 art. ll(1)(b).
188. Pardolesi, supra note 7, at 630-31. For case law on negligence actions, see e.g.,
Cass. civ., sez. II, 28 jul. 1986, n.4833, LA NUOVA GIURISPRUDENZA CIVILE
COMMENTATA [NUOVA GIUR. CIV. COMM.] 1987, I, 241 (holding that wine producer that
purchased moldy corks from cork distributor had action in negligence against cork
manufacturer to recover damages to bottled wine and business reputation).
189. ScoTT BALDWIN ET AL., THE PREPARATION OF A PRODUCr LIABILITY CASE §
2.17.1 (2d ed. 1993).
190. Id.; see e.g., Bocre Leasing Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 645 N.E.2d 1195
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On the other hand, the Decree includes among damages that can be
claimed those damages resulting from the loss of or harm to property
different from the defective product, provided three conditions are met: (1)
that the property is of a type that is normally for private use and
consumption, (2) that the property was mainly so used by the harmed
party, and (3) that the damages are in excess of a threshold of 750,000
lire. 191 These conditions for a strict liability claim for damages to tangible
property clearly indicate the intent to provide more accessible protection
to individual consumers as opposed to businesses, considered sophisticated
enough to protect their interests by their own means, including contractual
protection."9 It should be noted, however, that while the Directive defines
damage to property as damage to "any item" quantifiable in at least 500
ECU, the Decree may be construed as more generously permitting the
threshold to be reached by adding the damages to a plurality of items even
though damage to each item was below the threshold.' 93 In any case
below-threshold damage to tangible property may be claimed in accordance
with the Civil Code's general provisions on non-contractual liability.
The Decree makes no provision for punitive damages. Because general
rules are applicable where the Decree is silent, pursuant to the Civil Code
only compensatory damages are recoverable. 194 It is interesting to note the
recent American tort reform movement that includes efforts to place a cap
on punitive damages, to impose more stringent standards for punitive
damages recoveries, or to prohibit altogether such damages.'95
B. Entry into the Strewn of Commerce
Art. 7. Placing the Product into the Strewn of Commerce
1. A product is placed into the stream of commerce when it is
delivered to the buyer, to the user, or to an agent thereof, even for the
purpose of examination or trial.
(1995) (holding that tort recovery in strict products liability and negligence against a
manufacturer is not available to a downstream purchaser where the claimed losses flow
from damage to the property that is the subject of the contract).
191. Decree No. 224 art. 11(2).
192. Pardolesi, supra note 7, at 632.
193. Directive 85/374 art. 9(b), at 31; Decree No. 224 art. 11(2).
194. C.c. arts. 2056, 1223, & 1226.
195. See, e.g., Michael J. Wagner, Leveling the Liability Playing Field: Product
Liability Reform, Federal Developments, and the Illinois Model, Presentation to the
Corporate Counsel Section of the New York State Bar Association (Oct. 17, 1995).
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2. Placing into the stream of commerce occurs also by delivery to the
carrier orforwarderfor shipping to the buyer or user.
3. Liability is not excluded if the placing into the strewn of commerce
is a result of an execution sale, unless the judgment debtor gave
specific notice of the defect either by a statement to the enforcement
officer at the time of levy or by notice served upon the execution
creditor and filed with the clerk of the court from which execution
issued within fifteen days of the levy. ' 96
Although the Directive makes several references to the concept of
putting a product into circulation, it does not define the moment when a
product is put into circulation or, as expressed in this writing, placed into
the stream of commerce. The Italian lawmaker instead deemed this
concept significant enough to attempt to define it in article 7 of the Decree.
The determination of the time the product enters the stream of commerce
is relevant for several purposes. It is necessary first to establish the
running of the period of repose. 197 It is also necessary to establish the
moment for determining the "state of the art. 198 It may determine if the
manufacturer truly put the product into the stream of commerce or whether
the defect existed at that moment.1 99 It is similarly significant in New
York where, to make out a prima facie case in strict liability, the plaintiff
must establish that a defect existed at the time the product left the hands
of the manufacturer.2 °°
The Decree provides that the moment of entry into circulation or the
stream of commerce is the moment of "delivery" of the product.20 1 The
moment of delivery is when the risk to potential plaintiffs posed by the
defective product first arises. Under Italian law, ordinarily delivery
completes a sale in the sense that one of the seller's obligations under the
contract is to deliver the goods to the buyer.'0
196. Decree No. 224 art. 7.
197. Id. art. 14.
198. Id. art. 6(1)(e).
199. For purposes of Decree No. 224 arts. 6(l)(a), (b).
200. See Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Packing Mach. Co., 403 N.E.2d 440 (N.Y.
1980) (holding that defectively designed product is one which, at time it leaves seller's
hands, is unreasonably dangerous; manufacturer's responsibility is gauged as of time
product leaves manufacturer's hands).
201. Decree No. 224 art. 7(1).
202. C.c. art. 1476(1).
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Delivery may occur, however, prior to the transfer of title and even
when the thing is on the premises of third parties - including the
manufacturer. These possibilities are expressed by the phrase "even for
the purpose of examination or trial" in the first paragraph of article 7.
Delivery in visione or for the purpose of examination is not defined
in the Civil Code but presumably refers to several types of sale defined in
the Code. One such type is the sale con riserva di gradimento.2 3 Here,
no sale occurs until the satisfaction of the buyer, who received delivery,
is expressed or implied. Another type is the sale su campione or by
sample in which the prospective buyer receives the thing prior to making
an offer or acceptance.' °  The sale is a prova or "on trial," when the
contract provides that the sale is conditional upon the buyer's determination
that the thing has the qualities promised or is adequate for its purpose.' °5
Because the thing is at the buyer's premises, delivery occurs prior to
completion of the sale.
Since a thing may be viewed at the seller's premises, the concept of
stream of commerce may well extend to things on the manufacturer's
premises so long as the buyer's satisfaction is expressed or implied.2 °6 By
analogy delivery should also include the exhibition of merchandise in a
place ordinarily used for sales.20 7
Delivery to a user also places a product into the stream of
commerce.28 Here no sale is involved. The statutory language does not
require that the use be part of the business activity of the user. It should
be sufficient that the user have a contractual right to use the product.0 9
It seems, therefore, that delivery means any voluntary transfer of
control over the product to another. The Directive's general approach
suggests that there cannot be strict liability unless the manufacturer's
203. Id. art. 1520.
204. Id. art. 1522.
205. Id. art. 1521.
206. Id. art. 1520(2); Daniela Caruso, Messa in circolazione del prodotto, in NUOVE
LEGGI civ., 584.
207. Caruso, supra note 206, at 584.
208. Decree No. 224 art. 7(1). Also in the United States, a sale is not a necessary
predicate to the imposition of strict liability in tort upon a manufacturer where the
manufacturer has placed a defective product in the stream of commerce by other means.
See Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding that a new model
fork-lift truck delivered as a demonstrator placed product in stream of commerce, as if
product had been sold for nominal down payment subject to return if not satisfactory after
trial period).
209. Caruso, supra note 206, at 585.
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transfer of control is voluntary. The Directive is careful to avoid imposing
liability on manufacturers for risks that are beyond their control.2"'
Accordingly, under the Decree a manufacturer would not be strictly liable
for harm resulting from stolen or lost defective products. Any liability in
these situations would be founded on traditional negligence rules. n
Even delivery to a carrier or forwarder places the product into the
stream of commerce. 12 From this it appears that delivery means more the
loss of control by the manufacturer than the acquisition of control by the
buyer or user. The reference to carriers and forwarders may well imply
that in general a product is placed into the stream of commerce when a)
the consignee is independent from the manufacturer, b) physical control
over the product is transferred, and c) the delivery occurs within a
business transaction. 213 Accordingly, for example, the delivery of products
to a bailee (depositario, article 1766 Civ. Code) or a warehouse (magazzini
generali, article 1787 Civ. Code) would place them into the stream of
commerce, even though neither is a buyer or user.21 4
With regard to the moment an unfinished good becomes a product and
enters the stream of commerce, it is possible to distinguish at least two
situations. Where a single manufacturer creates the product in a process
that involves two or more plants or facilities, it is only after the completion
of the last work phase that delivery to a third party will place the product
into the stream of commerce. In this situation, innocent bystanders who
are harmed during intervals of the production process, such as for
movement or storage of the products, would be limited to recovery under
traditional negligence rules. On the other hand, where the production
process involves several manufacturers, the more or less finished product
that leaves one manufacturer's plant for the next plant is a product that
enters the stream of commerce.215 In such case, however, the definition
itself of "defective" is relative to the expectati,3ns of safety based on the
applicable production standards. Should the unfinished product comply
with those standards, it is likely the product will not be "defective."
210. Id.; see Directive 85/374 art. 7, at 31.
211. Caruso, supra note 206, at 585.
212. Decree No. 224 art. 7(2). A seller performs its obligation to deliver when the
seller puts the goods in the possession of the carrier or forwarding agent. C.c. art.
1510(2).
213. Caruso, supra note 206, at 585-86.
214. Id. at 586.
215. Id.
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Similar issues exist with respect to completely finished products that
are distributed through channels that legally may well be branches of the
manufacturer's enterprise. Here, the moment of entry into the stream of
commerce may turn on the degree of independence from the manufacturer
of the business to which the products are delivered.
It is interesting to note that the Decree adds execution sales for the
benefit of creditors as a form of entry into the stream of commerce.216
The policy underlying the imposition of strict liability here is that in an
execution sale the manufacturer obtains a benefit from the product because
the proceeds will go toward extinguishing its debt, and this benefit justifies
having the manufacturer stand behind the product's safety. 217  This
contrasts with the policy in the United States, where the Restatement
clarifies that the strict liability provisions do not apply to "sales of the
stock of merchants out of the usual course of business, such as execution
sales, bankruptcy sales, bulk sales, and the like."
218
C. Defenses
Art. 6. Exclusion of Liability
1. There is no liability:
a) if the manufacturer did not place the product into the stream
of commerce;
b) if the defect that caused the harm did not exist when the
manufacturer placed the product into the strewn of commerce;
c) if the manufacturer neither made the product for sale or for
any other form of distribution for profit, nor made or distributed
the product in the conduct of its business;
d) if the defect is a result of the product's compliance with
specifications imposed by law or a binding regulation;
e) if the state of scientific and technical knowledge, at the time
the manufacturer placed the product into the strewn of commerce,
does not justify considering the product defective;
f) with regard to a manufacturer or seller of a component or a
raw material, if the defect is solely a result of the design of the
product in which the component or raw material was incorporated
216. Decree No. 224 art. 7(3).
217. Caruso, supra note 206, at 590.
218. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A cmt. f (1965).
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or of the compliance of said component or raw material with the
instructions given by the manufacturer that used it.
219
Article 6 faithfully reproduces the circumstances that article 7 of the
Directive allows a manufacturer to allege to exclude strict liability. 220 The
burden of proving these circumstances is on the manufacturer. 221 The
Decree does not permit a manufacturer to avoid Uabitity by proof of having
taken all effective measures to avoid the harm.222
There is no liability for a manufacturer who did not place the product
into the stream of commerce.223 While the Directive does not define what
constitutes placing into the stream of commerce, as noted above the Decree
devotes its entire article 7 to the concept. 24
In accordance with the principle that strict liability arises only when
a defect is the result of the manufacturer's conduct, the manufacturer
cannot be held strictly liable for defects that did not exist at the time the
product was placed into the stream of commerce.22 5 The Restatement
contains the same qualification.226 In New York a manufacturer cannot be
held strictly liable where, after the product leaves its possession and
control, there is a subsequent modification which substantially alters the
product and is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.227
The existence of a defect at the time of entry into the stream of
commerce is an issue that bears upon the very definition of
defectiveness .22' Because the manufacturer has the burden of proof on
circumstances that exclude its strict liability, and because it seemed to the
Italian lawmaker that proof that a product was not defective at the time it
was placed into the stream of commerce, especially after much time has
passed, may be practically impossible, the Decree made special provision
219. Decree No. 224 art. 6.
220. Cf. Directive 85/374 art. 7, at 31. The manufacturer may nonetheless be found
liable to the harmed party on a different legal theory.
221. Decree No. 224 art. 8(2).
222. Instead, C.c. art. 2050, which applies to the performance of dangerous activities,
permits this showing to rebut the presumption of negligence.
223. Decree No. 224 art. 6(a).
224. Id. art. 7; see generally Directive 85/374.
225. Decse Ni. 224 an. 6(1)(b).
226. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A(1)(b) and cmt. g (1965).
227. Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 403 N.E.2d 440 (1980).
228. See Decree No. 224 art. 5(1)(c).
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for the type of proof that is to be deemed sufficient on this issue.29
Moreover, where an action is brought against an intermediate manufacturer
for its unfinished good, this defendant can exclude its strict liability by
showing that the defect did not exist when it placed the semi-finished
product or raw material into the stream of commerce by delivery to the
ultimate manufacturer.23°
Because the conditions specified in letter c) must both be present to
exclude strict liability, recourse to this ground of strict liability exclusion
is likely to be limited. Indeed, a manufacturer that transfers as a gift a
product it made for that purpose but in the conduct of its business cannot
benefit from the exemption, just as a manufacturer that transfers for profit
a product made independently of its business activity. The provision is
structured, therefore, to implement the underlying policy consideration of
the Decree, that is, to hold the manufacturer of a product strictly liable in
two situations. One is the case where a business organization makes or
distributes the product, in view of the safety that consumers expect of
products obtained in these circumstances, whether the business organization
sells the product or gives it away. The second situation is where the
manufacturer sells the product even independently of its business, because
of the similar expectation of safety that consumers have in a product
purchased for a price."'
Letter d) reflects the policy that mandatory behavior should not be
penalized.232 For a manufacturer to benefit from this provision, the law or
regulation must not permit any discretion in the manufacture of the
product. This case is likely to be rare, because administrative regulations
usually impose minimum standards in the manufacture of regulated
products and allow the manufacturer to implement any innovations or
improvements it may deem appropriate.233
Letter e) involves "development risks" and introduces the so-called
state of the art defense 3.2 4 The Directive provides that a manufacturer is
not liable if the state of the art was not such as to enable the manufacturer
229. See id. art. 8(2).
230. Id. arts. 6(1)(b), (f), construed with art. 7.
231. Nino Matassa, Esclusione della responsibilitn in NUOVE LEGGI civ., 562-63.
Therefore, it appears that the Decree's reach is broader than the situations contemplated by
the Restatement, which requires the seller to be "engaged in the business of selling such
a product." RESTATEMENT (SECONt) Or TORTS § 402 A(1)(a) and cmt. f (1965).
232. Decree No. 224 art. 6(d).
233. Matassa, supra note 231, at 564.
234. Decree No. 224 art. 6(e).
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to discover the existence of the defect.2 35 The Directive also provides,
however, that a member state may derogate from its article 7(e) so that a
manufacturer remains strictly liable even if it might prove that the state of
the art did not permit it to discover the existence of the defect.236
The Italian legislature chose to exclude strict liability for development
risks, thus relieving manufacturers from strict liability if the state of the art
at the time the product is placed into the stream of commerce does not
show the product to be defective. The Report on the draft decree
explained, inter alia, that liability in negligence is sufficient to induce the
utmost care in experimenting and that, moreover, the lack of statistical
data on development risks makes for greater difficulty in calculating them
and passing their insurance costs on to consumers.237
Therefore, strict liability is excluded if the product could not be
considered defective based on the state of scientific and technical
knowledge at the time the manufacturer placed the product into the stream
of commerce. 238 "State of the art" may be a defense in America, too.
239
It has been defined as "the safety, technical, mechanical and scientific
knowledge in existence and reasonably feasible for use at the time of
manufacture.O"2 Because the Decree's provision refers only to
"knowledge," it would seem to make industry custom, practice and
standards irrelevant. That is, to claim the exclusion from strict liability it
would not be sufficient for the manufacturer to show that no other
manufacturer had adopted a certain precaution to remove a danger.241
235. Directive 85/374 art. 7(e), at 31.
236. Id. art. 15, at 32.
237. Matassa, supra note 231, at 566-67.
238. Decree No. 224 art. 6(e).
239. See e.g., Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 422 N.Y.S.2d 969, 975 n.2 (App. Div. 1979)
(stating that ordinarily it is defendant who must prove as a defense that its design conforms
to state of the art at time of manufacture).
240. Id. (quoting Uniform Products Liability Law, § 106(a), reprinted in 44 Fed.Reg.,
2996, 2998).
241. In the United States, it is unlikely that a showing of adherence to industry custom
and standards, alone, would be sufficient to exonerate a manufacturer. See, e.g., Raney v.
Honeywell, Inc., 540 F.2d 932, 938 (8th Cir. 1976) (providing that in an action based on
strict liability, the jury could consider knowledge common to those in industry and
knowledge available to defendant, but not industry standards, in determining whether
design was unreasonably dangerous); George v. Celotex Corp._ 914 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir.
1990) (holding that manufacturer may not rest content with industry practice, for entire
industry may have lagged in its knowledge of a product). As stated in the dissenting
opinion of Jackson, J. in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 56 (1953), if industry
practice were considered a conclusive guide to due care, "one free disaster would be
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Accordingly, the ordinary case of exemption from strict liability is where
the knowledge available at the time did not permit awareness that a product
was in fact dangerous.*2 Another case may be where the risk is known
but there is insufficient knowledge on how to eliminate it.
243
It will be interesting to see how the Italian courts will apply the
concept of "state of scientific and technical knowledge" to determine
whether a manufacturer should have been aware of a risk at the time of
placing the product into the stream of commerce.2' The standard is an
entirely objective one, i.e., it takes into account the availability of research
on the matter exchanged through the "information circuits" of the world-
wide scientific community, no matter where the research was performed
or in what language it was published.245
An indication of what is encompassed by the concept of "state of
scientific and technical knowledge" may be found in decisions that applied
article 2050 Civil Code, which raises a presumption of negligence in the
exercise of "dangerous activities." 246  The defendant can rebut this
presumption if it shows it adopted all effective measures to avoid the harm.
Such measures include the performance of tests suggested by the state of
scientific and technical knowledge at the time of manufacture.247 It has
been held, moreover, that the available "effective measures" are not only
the established tests specific to ascertaining a product's safety but also
experimental or still unperfected tests used in general for scientific
research.248
permitted as to each new product before the sanction of civil liability was thrown on the
side of high standards of safety."
242. Decree No. 224 art. 6(e).
243. Matassa, supra note 231, at 576.
244. In situations where several persons participate in the manufacture of the product,
the relevant time to determine the availability of the defense in question would vary; it
would be the moment of sale for an importer and a seller and of placing the product into
the stream of commerce for the manufacturer. Giorgia Tassoni, La produzione difarmaci
tra l'art. 2050 C.c. ed i cosiddetti development risks, Giur. It. 1991, I, 2, 816, 822.
245. Matassa, supra note 231, at 578. In the United States, a manufacturer is held to
the knowledge of an expert in its field and, therefore, it has a duty to keep abreast of
scientific knowledge, discoveries and advances and is presumed to know what is imparted
thereby. George, 914 F.2d at 28. In New York, a drug manufacturer exercises reasonable
care in obtaining knowledge of the dangers inherent in its products through research,
adverse reaction reports, scientific literature and other available methods. Baker v. St.
Agnes Hosp., 421 N.Y.S.2d g1, 85 (App. Div. 1979).
246. C.C. art. 2050.
247. Cass. civ., sez. III, 20 luglio 1993, n.8069, RESP. CIV. PREV., 61, 65 (1994).
248. Id. In New York, relevant considerations in determining whether a manufacturer
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
It should be noted that even where a manufacturer is able to avoid
strict liability, it may still have a special challenge to avoid liability for
negligence. This is particularly true in those areas where the Italian courts
have determined that the manufacture of certain products constitutes
"dangerous activities. "24 9 For example, the production of pharmaceuticals
has been found to be a dangerous activity.25° In these cases, there may be
situations where it is a greater burden to prove the adoption of all effective
measures to avoid the harm, than to prove any of the circumstances
specified in article 6 of the Decree that exclude strict liability.
Letter f) is specifically directed to the manufacturer of a component
part or raw material. 251 The Decree provides that this manufacturer is
strictly liable only with respect to defects of the component or raw material
it supplied;1 2 strict liability is excluded, however, where such defects are
either attributable to their improper use by the ultimate manufacturer or the
result of compliance with the ultimate manufacturer's instructions.253
Similarly, in New York, a component manufacturer cannot be held
responsible to one who is harmed by the malfunction of the assembled unit
where the component was manufactured in accordance with the design,
plans and specifications of the unit's owner and such designs, plans and
specifications do not reveal any inherent danger either in the component
or the assembled unit.
254
Exclusion of liability in the first case, where the component or raw
material is improperly used by another manufacturer, flows from the
general principle that strict liability is contingent upon the "defectiveness"
of a product. Here, the component or raw material in itself is not
"defective," and it should be sufficient for its manufacturer to prove255 that
the product was not defective when it was placed into the stream of
commerce256 and that the product would not have caused harm if it had
exercised reasonable care concerning the design of a product include its keeping up with
recent scientific developments and the extent to which any tests were conducted to
ascertain the dangers of the product. Micallef v. Miehle Co., Div. of Miehle-Goss Dexter,
Inc., 348 N.E.2d 571 (N.Y. 1976).
249. C.c. art. 2050.
250. Cass. civ. sez. III, 20 luglio 1993, n.8069, RESP. CIV. PREY., 61, 64 (1994).
251. Decree No. 224 art. 6(f).
252. Id. art. 3(1).
253. fd. a t. 6kf).
254. Munger v. Heider Mfg. Corp., 456 N.Y.S.2d 271, 273 (App. Div. 1982).
255. Decree No. 224 art. 8(2).
256. Id. art. 6(b).
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been used properly by the other manufacturer.2 7  The component
manufacturer should not have to prove also that it was unaware of the use
to which the ultimate manufacturer intended to put the product in order to
avoid strict liability.258 If it were shown, however, that the component
manufacturer was aware of the improper intended use of its product, while
this very likely would make the component manufacturer liable in
negligence, it would not be grounds for strict liability.59
The second case concerns components that are "defective" when the
component manufacturer places them into the stream of commerce by
delivering them to the ultimate manufacturer. Here, however, a contract
requires the component manufacturer to make the component or raw
material according to specifications provided by the ultimate manufacturer.
Just as in the first case, it should be sufficient for the component
manufacturer to prove that its product complied with the specifications
given by the ultimate manufacturer and that the defect was a result of these
specifications. The component manufacturer should not have to prove also
that in view of these specifications it was not possible to avoid the
defect.2 °  Instead the burden is on the ultimate manufacturer, or the
plaintiff, to show that the component manufacturer could have avoided the
defect even while complying with the ultimate manufacturer's
specifications.26'
A ri. 9. Plurality of Torifeasors
1. Where more than one person is liable for the same harm, all are
jointly and severally liable for damages.
2. The co-obligor that has paid the entire damages is entitled to
contribution from the others on the basis of the extent of the
respective risks attributable to each, the degree of their culpability and
the extent of the resulting consequences. In the event of any doubt, the
apportionment shall be in equal shares.262
257. Id. art. 6(f).
258. Matassa, supra note 231, at 582.
259. Id. Matassa argues this is because the "defectiveness" is entirely the result of the
design of the product that incorporates the component or raw material. Moreover, Matassa
asserts the Decree de-emphasizes the relevance of the manufacturer's state of mind. Id.
260. Id. at 583.
261. Id.
262. Decree No. 224 art. 9.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Joint and several liability is generally imposed in negligence cases
where a court finds a plurality of tortfeasors responsible for the harm.263
The provision in the Decree is a clear statement that all persons strictly
liable for the same harm are jointly and severally responsible for the
redress of the harm. The expression "more than one person" in the first
paragraph most likely refers only to "manufacturers."'26 In the case of a
complex product manufactured by several persons, there may be several
parties strictly liable for the harm. Moreover, the Decree imposes strict
liability also on the apparent manufacturer and the importer of the product
into the European Union. 265 Thus it is necessary to allocate the damages
among these persons who participated in the manufacture and marketing
of the product.
The tortfeasor who has paid the entire damages has the right to seek
contribution. 266 A member state's internal rules of contribution or recourse
govern the allocation of damages. 267 The two criteria for contribution in
tort actions are 1) the degree of each tortfeasor's culpability, and 2) the
extent of the consequences it proximately caused. 268 The Decree's article
9(2) added a new third factor which is an expression of the modern theory
of "business risk. "269
This new criterion for sharing damages among tortfeasors, that of the
extent of the respective risks attributable to each for their non-negligent
conduct, implies that damages should be borne in largest measure by the
manufacturer that carries on the riskiest activity. 27° The riskiest activity
is that which presents the highest likelihood of accidents and the greatest
harm. Risk increases in proportion to the number of accidents and their
dimensions and the extent of harm. Accident statistics provide a risk
index. Accordingly, the insurance premium paid by the several tortfeasors
263. Id.; C.c. art. 2055.
264. Manufacturer is defined in Decree No. 224 art. 3. Dianora Poletti, Pluraliti di
responsabili, in NUOVE LEGGI civ., 600. This construction is consistent with the other
provisions of the Decree, with the fourth and fifth Whereas clauses of the Directive, and
with article 5 of the Directive. The reference to "any one of them" in the fifth Whereas
clause means any one of the manufacturers which, in most cases, will be the last
manufacturer that cooperated in making the product and, therefore, that contributed to
causing the harm. Id.
265. Decree No. 224 arts. 3(3), (4).
266. Decree No. 224 art. 9(2).
267. Directive 85/374 art. 5, at 31.
268. C.c. art. 2055.
269. Poletti, supra note 264, at 602.
270. Id. at 604.
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may provide the court with a measure, albeit open to adjustment, with
which to assign damages.27
It is not clear how a court will weigh "extent of the respective risks"
against "degree of culpability" and "extent of the consequences." The
application of the three criteria is likely to result in greater discretional
272powers for judges in strict liability cases.
In the event of any doubt as to the respective risk attributable to each
party, the apportionment of damages shall be in equal shares. 273  This
subordinate method of allocation of damages is available only where the
record does not permit even a rough evaluation of the measure in which
a plurality of persons contributed to causing the harm.274 It is likely the
courts will apply this standard when appropriate also in strict liability
cases. 275
It should be noted that a defendant sued on a strict liability theory may
seek contribution from another whose culpable conduct contributed to
causing the harm, even though this person cannot be held strictly liable.
Civil Procedure Code article 269 permits the defendant to make a third-
party claim for contribution against this person.276  In Lissoni v.
DeBernardi the plaintiff, who was injured when he operated a textile
machine that his employer had purchased from the manufacturer, sued the
manufacturer under the Decree.277  The manufacturer, in turn, impleaded
and sought contribution from the plaintiff's employer, alleging the third-
party defendant's negligence as the cause of the plaintiff's injury .27' The
tribunal found that both the manufacturer and the employer contributed
equally to causing the harm and held that the employer was liable to the
manufacturer for half of the plaintiff's recovery.279
Finally, it should be noted that there is case law which holds that the
manufacturers of a product may modify by agreement the rules for
271. Id.
272. Id. at 607.
273. Decree No. 224 art. 9(2). This provision parallels the provision of C.C. art. 2055,
which presumes equal culpability in negligence cases.
274. Poletti, supra note 264, at 608 (citing case law on C.c. art. 2055).
275. Id.
276. C.P.c. art. 269.
277. Lissoni v. DeBernardi, Trib. Monza, 11 settembre 1995, RESP. CiV. PREV., 371,
373 (1996).
278. Id. at 375.
279. Id.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
allocation of damages among co-tortfeasors. 280 The article 9 principles for
allocation of damages in strict liability situations should be similarly
modifiable .281
Art. 10. Negligence of Harmed Party
1. In cases where the negligence of the harmed party contributed to
causing the harm, the recovery is determined in accordance with the
provisions of art. 1227 of the civil code.
2. There shall be no recovery where the harmed party was aware of
the defect of the product and the danger resulting therefrom and
nonetheless willingly assumed the risk.
3. In the case of harm to property, the negligence of the person
having direct control over the property shall be deemed equivalent to
the negligence of the harmed party.
282
The Italian legislature in substance adopted the comparative negligence
standard of the Directive. 2" To achieve the goal of the reduction or
exclusion of the manufactuTel' s liability -when the harm is caused both by
a defect in the product and by the fault of the injured person, the
legislature chose to refer to the provisions of the Civil Code.284
Accordingly, a court will have to balance the degree of the harmed
person's fault and the extent of the resulting damages against the
manufacturer's strict liability. There has been concern that the application
of the first paragraph of article 1227 forces a prospectively uneasy
coexistence between the strict liability system and the method of reducing
compensation borrowed from the negligence rules.285
280. Poletti, supra note 264, at 609.
281. Id.
282. Decree No. 224 art. 10.
283. Directive 85/374 art. 8(2), at 31.
284. C.C. art. 1227 provides as follows:
1227 (Creditor's contributory fault).
If the negligence of the creditor contributed to cause the harm, the
damages shall be reduced on the basis of the degree of the negligence and the
extent of the consequences resulting from it.
There shall be no recovery for harm that the creditor could have avoided
through the exercise of ordinary care. Id.
285. Sergio Di Paola, Colpa del danneggiato, in NUOVE LEGGI Civ., 613, finds the
problem arises from the absence of any standard of care against which the manufacturer's
conduct is to be measured. in this regard the New York C.PL.R. § 1411, which has
adopted the doctrine of pure comparative negligence, provides as follows:
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Article 1227(2) of the Civil Code contemplates the cases where the
harmed person's culpable conduct is the sole cause of the harm, an
intervening cause that breaks the causal nexus.286 In these cases recovery
is barred, not merely reduced in proportion to the respective degrees of
fault. Accordingly, it is possible to view assumption of the risk as a
species of the general rule that excludes recovery. 2 7 The rule is similar
to that in American jurisdictions which bars recovery by a user or
consumer injured as a result of voluntary and unreasonable assumption of
the risk.288
Article 10 was to have a third paragraph that would have excluded any
reduction in damages where the contributorily negligent person was an
infant under 12 years of age. The fact that this protection does not
expressly appear, however, does not necessarily mean that no protection
is afforded by the Decree. There may be some protection in view of the
definition of "defective product" in article 5 which refers to "the use for
which the product may reasonably be intended and the uses which, in view
thereof, may reasonably be foreseen. "289 This language may provide
protection against reduction in recovery by consumers in view of their age,
intelligence and potential for unreasonable behavior. 29  Whether it is
In any action to recover damages for personal injury, injury to property, or
wrongful death, the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant or to the
decedent, including contributory negligence or assumption of risk, shall not bar
recovery, but the amount of damages otherwise recoverable shall be diminished
in the proportion which the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant or
decedent bears to the culpable conduct which caused the damages.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1411 (McKinney 1976). It should be noted that the phrase "culpable
conduct" was used instead of "negligent conduct" because the New York State Legislature
intended that this article would apply to cases where the conduct of one or more of the
parties would be found to be not negligent, but would nonetheless be a factor in
determining the amount of damages. Abergast v. Board of Educ. of South New Berlin
Central School, 480 N.E.2d 365 (N.Y. 1985) (quoting Twenty-first Ann. Report of N.Y.
Judicial Conference, 1976, 235, 240). The Court of Appeals noted that the wording of
C.P.L.R. § 1411 would make "comparative causation" a more accurate description of the
process. Id. Indeed, the defendant's culpable conduct may be of a nature that gives rise
to liability upon a theory of strict liability. Id. (quoting Twenty-first Ann. Report of N.Y.
Judicial Conference, 1976, 235, 242).
286. Cass. civ. sez. lav., 3 marzo 1983, n.1594, cited in IL CODICE CIVILE, supra note
39, at 1071.
287. Decree No. 224 art. 10(2); C.C. art. 1227(2), which Decree No. 224 art. 10(1)
incorporates by reference; Di Paola, supra note 285, at 618.
288. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A cmt. n (1965).
289. Decree No. 224 art. 5(l)(b).
290. Francesca Giardina, Sommario, in NUOVE LEGGI civ., 625.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
sufficient to provide such protection is doubtful, however, after the holding
of the Corte di Cassazione in Braghini.29'
Art. 12. Disclaimers
1. A pre-accident agreement that excludes or limits the liability toward
the harmed party provided by this decree is null and void. 
292
This provision is a further expression of the Directive's policy to
protect consumers. It introduces a general ban on agreements that disclaim
non-contractual liability. In this respect, it differs from article 1229 of the
Civil Code, which permits disclaimer clauses to the extent they do not
waive the right to claim damages caused by willful or reckless conduct.293
In the United States, the Restatement position is that strict liability cannot
be disclaimed.294 In New York, while disclaimers are not categorically
prohibited, a plaintiff in a strict products liability action who is a complete
stranger to the contract containing a disclaimer is not bound by its terms.295
Art. 13. Statute of Limitations
1. The right to seek damages ceases three years from the day the
harmed party became or should have become aware of the harm, the
defect and the identity of the culpable person.
2. In the case of aggravation of the injury, the period does not begin
to run until the day in which the harned party became or should have
become aware of an injury of sufficient significance to justify the
commencement of a lawsuit. 90
The general provisions of Italian law on the period of limitations of
actions apply to the extent these provisions do not conflict with those of the
Decree.297 The Directive does not affect the laws of member states that
regulate the suspension or interruption of the limitation period.298
291. Braghini v. Comune di San Bartolomeo al Mare, Cass. Civ., 29 settembre 1995,
n.10274, Foro It. 1996, I, 954; see supra text accompanying notes 150-62.
292. Decree No. 224 art.. 12.
293. Cf. C.C. art. 1229. It should be noted that C.c. art. 1341 provides that a disclaimer
clause that benefits the party that drafted the general terms and conditions of sale is
ineffective unless the other party specifically approves it in writing.
294. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 402 A cmt. m (1965).
295. Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 305 N.E.2d 750 (N.Y. 1973).
296. Decree No. 224 art. 13.
297. Mazzia, supra note 67, at 646.
298. Directive 85/374 art. 10(2), at 31. The general provisions on the statute of
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Under the general provisions, knowledge of the harm triggers the
limitations period. While the Civil Code states that the limitations period
begins on the day the event occurred,2 99 it is well settled that the period
begins to run when the harmed party knows or with the use of ordinary
care could know of the existence of the harm.3 "° Where the harm does not
immediately follow the event that caused it, the Court of Cassation has
consistently held that the period begins to run on the day the harm
occurs.30 1 However, where the harm is not ascertainable until a point in
time after the infliction of the harm, the period begins to run on the date
the harm is ascertainable. 3 02 The mere existence of signs of an injury or
of mere symptoms, which may or may not develop into an injury, do not
constitute the existence of a harm for statute of limitations purposes. 3
With regard to the required awareness of the product's defect, the
Decree3" refers to the defect that caused the harm.30 5 It has been opined,
moreover, that such awareness must include knowledge of the causal
nexus. 306
The Decree supplements the Directive, as it determines the beginning
of the limitations period in those cases where there is a progression from
limitations are found in the Civil Code. C.c. art. 2934-2963.
299. C.C. art. 2947(1) (the limitations period for negligence actions is five years.)
300. Cass. civ., sez. II, 18 maggio 1987, n.5432, cited in IL CODICE CIVILE, supra note
39, at 1906; Cass. civ. sez. III, 19 agosto 1983, n. 5412, cited in IL CODICE CIVILE, supra
note 39, at 1907. In New York, the general principle is that the three-year statute begins
to run when the injury occurs, not when it is discovered. Martin v. Edwards Laboratories,
Div. of American Hospital Supply Corp., 457 N.E.2d 1150 (N.Y. 1983); Victorson v. Bock
Laundry Mach. Co., 335 N.E.2d 275 (N.Y. 1975). The date of discovery of the injury is
relevant in the exceptional cases contemplated in C.P.L.R. § 214-b and § 214-c. The date
of injury principle, however, might be interpreted differently, e.g., in repetitive stress injury
cases, as either the moment of first use of the product, Blanco v. AT&T Co., 646 N.Y.S.2d
99 (App. Div. 1996), or the date of manifestation of symptoms, Piper v. Int'l Bus. Mach.
Corp., 639 N.Y.S.2d 623 (App. Div. 1996).
301. Mazzia, supra note 67, at 643.
302. Id.
303. Id. In New York, the date of "discovery" for purposes of the special limitation
period that covers exposure to toxic substances, C.P.L.R. 214-c, is the moment of
discovery of the fact that the symptoms suffered by the plaintiff are attributable to an
injury inflicted upon the plaintiff by a third party. In re New York.County DES Litig., 639
N.Y.S.2d 40, 41 (App. Div. 1996).
304. Decree No. 224 art. 5.
305. Mazzia, supra note 67, at 646.
306. Id.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
apparently negligible signs and symptoms to a serious injury.307 The
problem in the application of this rule, however, is to determine the
moment when the harm is of sufficient significance to justify the
commencement of a lawsuit.
In certain instances, the Civil Code allows for the suspension of the
statute of limitations. 30 8 For example, if the person entitled to bring the
action is an infant or is otherwise incapacitated the limitation period does
not start to run until six months after the appointment of a guardian or
until the incapacity ceases. 3 9  The Civil Code further allows for the
interruption of the limitation period.310 Events that interrupt the limitation
period include commencement of a lawsuit, a written demand for
performance, and admission or acknowledgment of a right. Upon an
interruption the limitation period begins to run anew.
It is important to note, further, that article 14 of the Decree31 2 may
result in the reduction of the three-year limitations period, i.e., where the
harm occurred less than three years prior to the expiration of the period of
ten years from the date the manufacturer put into the stream of commerce
the actual product that caused the harm.313
A rt. 14. Statute of Repose
1. The right to recover damages lapses ten years after the date the
manufacturer or the importer into the European Community placed the
product that caused the harm into the stream of commerce.
2. Lapse is prevented only by the commencement of a lawsuit, unless
the lawsuit is extinguished, or by presentation of a creditor's claim in
an insolvency proceeding or by the liable person's acknowledgment of
the right.
3. The act that prevents lapse against one of several tortfeasors shall
not have any effect against the others."'4
This provision enacts the European Union Council's policy decision
to impose an outer time limit or ceiling upon the time within which
307. Decree No. 224 art. 13(2).
308. C.c. arts. 2941 and 2942.
309. Id. art. 2942.
310. Id. arts. 2943-2945.
311. d. art. 2945.
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consumers can exercise the special remedies.3 15 Similar provisions have
been enacted in the United States. In Connecticut, for instance, no product
liability action may be brought later than ten years from the date that the
defendant parted with possession or control of the product.316 A 20-year
statute of repose was voted by the U.S. Senate as part of the proposed
product liability reform. The period was to begin at the "time of delivery"
of the product.
317
Should the product cause a harm after ten years from when it entered
the stream of commerce, the harmed party may not bring an action under
the Decree. The statute of repose for strict liability actions should be
construed with the Civil Code's general provisions on the lapse of
claims.31 8 Therefore, where lapse is prevented,31 9 under the general rules
the right to recover damages is governed by the provisions on the statute
of limitations.32° In this case there may be a question as to whether the
Code's rules or the Decree's special rules on the statute of limitations
apply.
The defendant will have the burden of pleading and proving the facts
that cause the lapse of the harmed party's right to recover damages. 32' The
defendant may offer into evidence the invoice which purports to pertain to
the product in question to indicate the day the product was placed into the
stream of commerce.322
It has been opined that where the lawsuit does not name the proper
party defendant, and perhaps also where the lawsuit is commenced against
a supplier without the prior demands directed by the Decree,323 even the
commencement of the lawsuit will not operate to prevent lapse of the
harmed party's claims. 324 The circumstances that extinguish lawsuits are
voluntary discontinuance and neglect to prosecute. 32
315. Directive 85/374 art. 11, at 32.
316. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-577a(a) (1996).
317. H.R. 956, 104th CONG. § 109(b)(1) (1995).
318. C.c. art. 2964-2969.
319. Decree No. 224 art. 14(2).
320. C.c. art. 2967.
321. Mazzia, supra note 67, at 648.
322. Bassi v. Poliedro di Guzzo e C. s.n.c., Trib. Milano, 13 apr. 1995, DANNO E RESP.,
381, 382 (1996) (denying statute of repose defense where record did not contain
manufacturer's invoices pertaining to product).
323. Decree No. 224 art. 4(1), (2).
324. Mazzia, supra note 67, at 648 (citing cases at n. 11).
325. For extinction of lawsuits see C.P.C. arts. 306-310.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
The question may arise whether lapse of the right to recover damages
is prevented if the manufacturer's admission or acknowledgment relates to
a harm that occurs after the expiration of ten years from the date the
product entered the stream of commerce. It has been opined that because
an admission or acknowledgment presupposes the existence of another's
right, and because after the expiration of ten years such right cannot exist,
an admission or acknowledgment cannot benefit the harmed party where
the harm occurs after the expiration of the ten year period.326
The provision in paragraph 3 is a departure from the general rule set
forth in article 1310(1) of the Civil Code.327 The general rule is that the
commencement of a lawsuit against one of several jointly liable parties
starts the period of limitations running anew as to the others.328
D. Burden of Proof
Art. 8. Proof
1. The harmed party must prove damages, the defect and the causal
connection between the defect and the damages.
2. The manufacturer must prove the facts that exclude liability
pursuant to the provisions of art. 6. For the purpose of excluding
liability pursuant to art. 6, letter b), it is sufficient to show that,
taking into account all the circumstances, it is unlikely that the defect
existed at the time the product was placed into the stream of
commerce.
3. When it appears possible that the harm was caused by a defect of
the product, the judge may direct the manufacturer to advance the
costs of the technical consultant's activities.29
The Decree complies with the Directive's admonition to limit the
items of proof imposed on harmed parties.33 ° The Decree does not require
the consumer to prove the correct or appropriate use of the product or that
the product was defective when it left the manufacturer. 33' Accordingly,
326. Mazzia, supra note 67, at 649.
327. Compare Decree No. 224 art. 14(3) with C.c. art. 1310(1).
328. C.c. art. 1310.
329. Decree No. 224 art. 8.
330. Directive 85/374 art. 4, at 31; Decree No. 224 art. 9(l).
331. Decree No. 224 art. 8(2) places on the manufacturer the burden of proving that the
defect did not exist when the manufacturer placed the product into the stream of
commerce. In New York, however, the plaintiff must establish also that the defect existed
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these special rules on proof avoid increased evidentiary demands which
otherwise would be made on the consumer under the Civil Code.332
The items of proof the Decree requires are 1) damages, 2) defect, and
3) causal connection between defect and damages. The harmed party must
claim he or she incurred the recoverable damages333 and provide an
expert's opinion to support the extent of damages claimed. Proof of the
defect is more sensitive, in view of the focus that the Decree places on the
defectiveness of a product. Under the Decree, the proof must concern the
absence of safety that can reasonably be expected of the product. 334 The
plaintiff's burden of proof will vary in relation to the particular defect and
the circumstances surrounding the occurrence.335 In failure to inform
cases, for example, where there is complete absence of instructions in one
product out of the entire line, the plaintiff's burden of proof will be
satisfied simply by a showing that the product differs from the others of
the same model line.336 Where the instructions are insufficient or missing
for the entire line of the product, the plaintiff must prove defectiveness on
the basis of the relevant circumstances. 3
It should be noted that article 8 does not require the plaintiff to prove
also his or her reasonable conduct. 338 This factor, though, may be relevant
when the product left the manufacturer's hands to make out a prima facie case. 1 N.Y.
P..I. 2:141.1 (1995 Supp) (citing Steckal v. Haughton Elevator Co., Inc., 449 N.E.2d 1264
(N.Y. 1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 402 A cmt. g).
332. C.c. art. 2697 (providing that the party seeking enforcement of a right has the
burden of proving the facts that underlie its claim and the party opposing enforcement must
prove the facts that are the basis of its defense). However, art. 2697 may require the
plaintiff to also prove that the defendant manufactured the product in question. In New
York, unless there is testimonial or documentary evidence, which would support at least an
inference that the defendant manufactured the product, the complaint must be dismissed.
D'Amico v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 569 N.Y.S.2d 962, 964 (App.Div. 1991).
333. Decree No. 224 art. 11.
334. Decree No. 224 art. 5(1).
335. In New York, a plaintiff need not prove the specific defect, where proof may be
circumstantial. A defect may be inferred if the plaintiff proves that the product did not
perform as intended by the manufacturer and excludes all causes of the accident not
attributable to the defendant. Halloran v. Virginia Chemicals Inc., 361 N.E.2d 991 (N.Y.
1977). Furthermore, a manufacturing defect may be inferred from proof of post
manufacture design modifications. Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 417 N.E.2d 545 (N.Y.
1981).
336. Decree No. 224 art. 5(3).
337. Id. art. 5(1).
338. Marti, supra note 41, at 595. Unreasonable behavior should include the consumer's
assumption of the risk in the presence of a product's defect. Id.
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on the issue of causation, that is, to determine whether the harm resulted
from the plaintiff's conduct instead of from the defect.3 3 9 The Decree does
not indicate the consumer's conduct among the factors that exclude a
manufacturer's liability 4 ° However, it excludes liability if the defect did
not exist when the product entered the stream of commerce.341 Upon a
finding that the harm resulted from the consumer's conduct, therefore, it
might be possible to infer that the product was not defective and,
accordingly, to exclude liability under the Decree.342 The Decree would
seem to place on the manufacturer the burden of proving such
unreasonable behavior by the consumer as a circumstance which shows it
was unlikely that a defect existed when the manufacturer placed the
343product into the stream of commerce.
There is no reason to assume that the manufacturer's proof is limited
to the items of article 6 referenced in the second paragraph of article 8.
Indeed, a manufacturer may allege contributory negligence or that an
impleaded third party was negligent. These circumstances would expand
the manufacturer's items of proof; moreover, the manufacturer may submit
evidence to rebut the plaintiff's proof.3
The Decree does not appear to modify the general rules on the weight
of different methods of proof.345 There is likely to be much use of
inferences in view of the difficulty of proof. It is also likely that the judge
will appoint a technical consultant to clarify specific issues that call for
technical knowledge.34 6 Of significance will be the technical consultant's
report,34 7 which traditionally has assisted the courts in evaluating the
evidence introduced by the parties, but which itself is not evidence. as
339. Id.
340. Decree No. 224 art. 6.
341. Id. art. 6(1)(b).
342. Id.
343. Id. art. 8(2).
344. Marti, supra note 41, at 596.
345. A judge must evaluate the evidence with prudent discretion, unless directed
otherwise by law. C.P.c. art. 116. Unlike American law, Italian law does not have a full
body of technical rules that govern the admissibility, materiality and relevancy of evidence.
346. See C.P.c. art. 61 (Technical Consultant) and art. 62 (Technical Consultant's
Activities). The technical consultant is an impartial expert whose function is to advise the
court. Each party may appoint its own technical consultant. C.p.C. art. 201. The technical
consultant calls to mind the court appointed expert contemplated by the Federal Rules of
Evidence Rule 706.
347. See C.P.c. art. 195.
348. Marti, supra note 41, at 595.
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The third paragraph of article 8 is an exception to article 90 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, which establishes the party that must advance
certain costs of a lawsuit. 349 The manufacturer will advance the costs of
the technical consultant's activities if it appears possible that the harm was
caused by a defect of the product. Otherwise, article 90 of the Code of
Civil Procedure will govern how the costs will be advanced.3 50  The
Decree's provision is an expression of the policy that attempts to minimize
the court costs of the party considered economically weaker."'
E. Coordination of the Decree with the Broader Legal System
A rt 15. Liability A rising from Other Provisions of Law
1. The provisions of this decree neither exclude nor limit the rights
conferred upon the harmed party by other laws.
2. The provisions of this decree are not applicable to the damages
resulting from nuclear accidents under law 31 December 1962, no.
1860, as modified. 1
2
The thirteenth Whereas clause of the Directive states that the Directive
should not affect the provisions in the legal systems of member states that
already permit a harmed party to claim damages based on contractual
liability or non-contractual liability, as long as they provide effective
protection of consumers.353 The Decree offers to parties harmed from
defective products a new cause of action in addition to the remedies
traditionally available.3 4 In situations where the facts would permit both
an action under the Decree and one pursuant to the general provisions for
non-contractual claims, article 15(1) clearly implies that the plaintiff may
opt for either.355 Specifically, the plaintiff may bring an action under the
traditional rules if the strict liability action is no longer timely, either
because the statute of limitations has run or because the passage of ten
349. Decree No. 224 art. 8(3); C.P.C. art. 90.
350. C.P.C. art. 90 provides that, except for indigent persons, the party that requests an
activity during trial, such as a technical consultant's report, must advance the costs subject
to the award for court costs contained in the judgment or order that finally determines the
action.
351. Marti, supra note 41, at 597.
352. Decree No. 224 art. 15.
353. Directive 85/374, at 30.
354. Decree No. 224 art. 15(1).
355. Pardolesi, supra note 7, at 650.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
years has caused the right to recover damages to lapse. Moreover,
because the Decree is not applicable where the harm is below a certain
amount, or arises from certain uses of a product, or is caused by a certain
category of product or by a particular defect, the general negligence
provisions of the Civil Code will be more favorable to the plaintiff.
356
Paragraph 2 of article 15 of the Decree implements article 14 of the
Directive."' In Italy, civil liability resulting from nuclear accidents is
governed by Law No. 1860 of December 31, 1962358 and by a series of
international conventions to which Italy is a party.
35 9
Art. 16. Transitional Rules
1. The provisions of this decree are not applicable to products placed
into the stream of commerce prior to its effective date or 30 July
1988, whichever is earlier. 6°
An action for damages resulting from a defective product placed into
the stream of commerce prior to the times indicated must be brought under
the traditional rules of non-contractual liability. Again, as with the statute
of repose provision, the difficult issue to determine is the moment the
product was placed into the stream of commerce. It is not clear whether
the plaintiff or the defendant has the burden of proof on this issue.
The first reported decision in which a court applied the Decree was
Tentori v. Soc. Rossin, 61 where the court applied the new rules because
the purchase of the product from the retailer occurred after July 30,
1988.362 One may question whether it is fair to subject a manufacturer to
strict liability rules where the manufacturer placed the product into the
stream of commerce prior to the entry into force of the Decree. The
Decree, however, includes the sale of a product by a supplier to a
consumer within the broad definition of placing into the stream of
356. Barenghi, supra note 2, at 1337.
357. Decree No. 224 art. 15(2); Directive 85/374 art. 14, at 32.
358. Law No. 1860 of December 31, 1962, Gazz. Uff., 30 gennaio 1963, n.27, Lex
XLIX, part I, 321 (1963) as amended by Presidential Decree No. 519 of May 10, 1975,
Gazz. Uff., 6 nov. 1975, n.29 4 , Lex LXI, part I, 1884 (1975).
359. Pardolesi, supra note 7, at 651.
360. Decree No. 224 art. 16. (the Decree became effective 15 days after the date (June
23, 1988) it was published iri the Gazzetta Ufficiale.
361. Tentori v. Soc. Rossin, Trib. Monza, 21 luglio 1993, Foro It. 1994, I, 251. The
purchaser of a mountain bike brought an action against the bike manufacturer alleging a
design defect. Id.
362. Id. at 256.
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commerce. 363 Moreover, in the case in question the court may have also
considered that since the plaintiff purchased the product in August 1989,
it was likely the product had left the manufacturer's control after July 30,
1988, thus making the Decree's provisions applicable. In another decision,
the same tribunal noted that the plaintiff introduced into evidence the
manufacturer's invoice and shipping document showing that the product
entered the stream of commerce after July 30, 1988. 36
I. CONCLUSION
The European Union looked to the United States' strict products
liability experience as a model for the Directive. Accordingly, many of
the Decree's provisions parallel rules of American law. Thus, it is not
necessary to prove negligence to attribute liability. The concept of
"defective product" is similar and includes manufacturing, design and
warning defects. As in the United States, a manufacturer is able to avoid
liability if the defect did not exist when the product left the manufacturer's
control. Also similar is the availability of the comparatve negligence
defense. The Decree covers injuries to nonusers and
nonconsumers-innocent bystanders. It allows for damage to property as
well as for personal injuries.
There are, however, a number of significant differences. The
Directive focused on manufacturers and, among these, manufacturers
responsible for the finished product, instead of extending the strict liability
rules to all the possible persons that are in the chain of distribution. Only
exceptionally are sellers subjected to strict liability. The Directive's
approach is to put pressure on manufacturers to make safe products by
enabling persons later in the distribution chain to avoid strict liability by
indicating the manufacturer's identity. In the United States, instead, a
plaintiff may bring a strict liability action against a distributor, a retailer
or other seller. Here, the pressure to make safe products is also the result
of agreements in which manufacturers promise to hold these persons
harmless. Another difference concerns the nature of defective design.
The Decree applies the Directive's consumer-expectation test as the
standard to determine whether a product is unsafe owing to defective
design. The test considers the reasonably foreseeable uses of the product.
In the United States, instead, the courts apply a balancing test that weighs
363. Decree No. 224 art. 7(1).
364. Lissoni v. DeBemardi, Trib, Monza, 11 settembre 1995, RESt'. CIV. PREV., 371,
374 (1996).
90 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 17
the utility of the product and its cost against the risk involved in its use.
A further difference is that in Italy, recoverable damages are likely to be
lower, to the extent the applicable general rules on damages tend to
exclude awards for punitive damages and limit the amount of awards for
pain and suffering.
The law is relatively recent in the sense that not enough time has
passed to enable the courts to hand down more than a handful of decisions
that apply the Decree's provisions. Accordingly, many unclear aspects will
remain uncertain until they are settled by a sufficient number of decisions.
There will be uncertainty, moreover, when the courts are called upon to
apply the reasonableness standard to determine a product's defectiveness.
In this generally unfamiliar exercise, judges will make findings of fact as
to a consumer's reasonable expectations of a product's safety and the
reasonableness of the particular plaintiff's conduct with respect to the
product. This presents a new challenge which the courts might not be
prepared to meet.
